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This dissertation investigates the interaction between the quality of accounting infor -
ma tion and firms’ external environment – the institutions under which they operate, such
as industry and stock exchange. The research in this dissertation deals with the motivation
for earnings management (chapter 2), the consequence of accounting frauds on the failure
rate of IPO firms (chapter 3), and the effectiveness of actions taken by standard-setters to
improve the quality of accounting information (Chapter 4).
Chapter 2 focuses on firms’ industry environment and investigates whether industry
valuation has an impact on managers’ decisions to manage earnings. Based on U.S. market
data between 1985 and 2005, we find that industry valuation is positively correlated with
the magnitude of earnings management in that industry. Chapter 3 examines the conse -
quences of insider trading and accounting scandals on firms’ external environment and
uses the failure of European new markets as the empirical background. Using propensity
score matching and Cox proportional hazard regression, we find that listing on a European
new market doubles an IPO firm’s failure rate as compared with listing on an official
market. Finally, Chapter 4 examines whether the uniform adoption of IFRS by EU countries
in 2005 improved the quality of accounting information through the investigation of
changes in the quality of analyst forecasts. The empirical results show that the accuracy of
analyst forecasts increased, and the dispersion decreased, after the adoption of IFRS. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
The capital market has become an indispensable part of today’s economy. Investors 
and companies meet in this market to optimize the allocation of capital among them and to 
attempt to maximize their wealth. Financial information plays an imperative role, in that it 
helps investors and companies with the optimization process. However, there are two 
problems with the use of financial information. First, compared to investors, companies 
have superior information about investment plans, which creates information asymmetry. 
In order to attract new investors or retain existing ones, companies can selectively disclose 
information that is in their best interests. Second, companies may have an incentive to 
inflate the value of their investment plans so that investors are misled to invest in projects 
that cannot ultimately realize the returns promised. Because investors have an information 
disadvantage, it is difficult for them to detect such misleading behavior from the start. 
These problems—insufficient disclosure and incentives for value inflation—taken together, 
lead to the necessity to have information intermediaries who can provide credible and 
sufficient information to investors. Financial reports allow such reliable information to 
flow between companies and investors.  
Financial reports provide comprehensive information about public firms’ business 
activities, including both performance and company strategy. Such information provides 
the basis for investors to make their investment decisions, evaluate their investments’ 
performance, and measure managers’ performance. The Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (“FASB”) also states the objective of financial reporting in No. 1, Objectives of 
Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises [1978]: 
[F]inancial reporting should provide information to help present and potential 
investors and creditors and other users in assessing the amounts, timing, and 
uncertainty of prospective cash receipts… Thus, financial reporting should provide 
10
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information to help investors, creditors, and others assess the amounts, timing, and 
uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows to the related enterprise.  
Similarly, IAS 1.7 states that the purpose of a financial statement is “to provide 
information about the financial position, financial performance, and cash flows of an 
entity that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions.” 
A high-quality accounting system is the prerequisite for realizing these functions of 
accounting information. In such a system, both the quality of accounting standards and 
firms’ compliance with them are critical to ensuring high-quality accounting information. 
The quality of accounting standards is normally evaluated using metrics such as 
disclosure level, the magnitude of earnings management, the timeliness of loss recognition, 
and the association of earnings with share price. Normally, high-quality financial standards 
can provide investors with a larger amount of more relevant information, leave less room 
for earnings management, and ensure timely loss recognition, allowing investors to 
evaluate their investment’s performance in a more timely and accurate manner. 
The quality of financial reporting standards is not the only factor bearing on the 
financial reporting process. Previous research (e.g., Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003; 
Holthausen, 2003) argues that financial reporting outcomes also are affected by incentives 
for preparers and auditors, the legal and political system, ownership structure, financial 
market development, and other institutional features of the economy.  
For instance, the legal system’s influence derives from its enforcement of accounting 
standards and from litigation against the preparers and auditors of accounting reports. It 
has been documented that common law countries, such as the U.S., have higher levels of 
legal enforcement than code law countries, such as France and Germany, and, what is 
more, have a better investor protection mechanism (La Porta et al., 1998). Hung (2001) 
shows that accrual accounting is more value-relevant in countries with a higher level of 
investor protection. This may be because, on the one hand, the punishment for managers 
who exert opportunistic behavior is more severe in countries with a higher level of investor 
protection (La Porta et al., 1998), or, on the other hand, because the detection process is 
11
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stricter in these countries, increasing the possibility of litigation against auditors. Fan and 
Wong (2002) find that concentrated ownership is associated with lower degrees of 
disclosure of earnings information. From the point of view of accounting report preparers, 
Francis et al. (2005) document that the disclosure level of firms which need external 
financing is normally higher than their local country’s minimal disclosure requirements.  
The effects of ownership come from both the type of ownership (e.g., public or 
private) and the concentration of ownership. Burgsthaler et al. (2007) find that public firms 
in countries with large and highly developed markets engage in less earnings management 
than private firms in these countries. Francis and Wang (2008) find that in countries with 
stronger investor protection, earnings quality is higher for firms audited by Big-4 auditors 
than by non-Big-4 auditors.   
This dissertation aims to contribute to this literature by investigating the quality of 
accounting information and companies’ external environments—the institutions and 
factors under which they operate, such as industry and stock exchange. The research in this 
dissertation is comprised of three empirical essays, which deal with (a) the motivation for 
earnings management (chapter 2), (b) the consequences of accounting frauds for the failure 
rate of IPO firms (chapter 3), and (c) the effectiveness of actions taken by standards-setters 
to improve the quality of accounting information (Chapter 4). The following section will 
briefly introduce the topics addressed in these three chapters. 
 
1.2. Outlines 
 
Chapter 2 examines whether the external environment has an impact on earnings 
management. More specifically, this chapter tests whether the level of industry valuation is 
a motivation for earnings management.  The chapter’s contribution is that it links external 
environment and earnings management; in contrast, most existing studies examine 
motivations for earnings management from a firm-specific point of view, such as the 
pressure to meet analyst forecasts (Burgstahler and Eames, 1998; Degeorge et al., 1999), 
12
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or from a transaction-specific point of view, such as before an IPO or seasoned equity 
offerings (Teoh et al., 1998). 
Not many studies have examined how the external environment influences a firm’s 
earnings management decisions. As Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 380) conclude, “Most 
academic studies attempt to document earnings management, but do not provide evidence 
on its extent and scope. Consequently, existing evidence does not help standard-setters to 
assess whether current standards are largely effective in facilitating communications with 
investors, or whether they encourage widespread earnings management.” 
This chapter focuses on firms’ industry environment and investigates whether 
industry valuation has an impact on a given management’s decisions to manage earnings. 
We argue that a higher industry valuation increases the perceived benefits of earnings 
management at a time when the punishment associated with accrual reversal and the 
probability of detection are perceived to be lower. The increase in net benefit of earnings 
management will lead to an increase in earnings management. Using a sample of quarterly 
data of U.S. firms from 1985 to 2005, we examine whether the four-quarter lagged 
aggregate industry valuation has a significantly positive relationship with aggregate 
(current) discretionary accruals. Overall, we find a positive relationship between lagged 
industry valuation and these proxies of earnings management. Empirical results suggest 
that an increase of one standard deviation in the aggregate stock market valuation is 
associated with a significant increase of 2.4 cents in quarterly earnings per share for an 
average firm. This empirical finding also indicates that earnings management behavior is a 
result of firms’ external environments, which have large-scale effects on all firms. 
Therefore, standard-setters may try harder to curb earnings management behavior when the 
stock market heats up. 
Chapter 3 will examine the consequences of large-scale earnings management—that 
is, accounting scandals—on a firm’s external environment. This chapter chooses the 
European new markets, including the German Neuer Markt, the French Nouveau Marché, 
the Dutch NMAX, EuroNM Belgium, and the Italian Nuovo Mercato, as its empirical 
13
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background. All five markets failed after the discovery of insider trading and accounting 
scandals.  
The European new markets copied the institutional structure of NASDAQ, which has 
low criteria for admitting firms but strict disclosure requirements. At their inception, 
European new markets quickly attracted hundreds of entrepreneurial firms. However, after 
a short period, the legitimacy of this institutional setting was challenged by insider trading 
scandals and accounting frauds. Investors’ confidence dwindled, stock prices subsequently 
plunged, and trading volumes shrank. Such a situation finally led to the closure of all five 
markets. 
We analyze whether this failure of the new stock markets can be attributed at least 
partially to design flaws in their institutional setting. For example, Burghof and Hunger 
(2004) show that the original setup of Germany’s Neuer Markt suffered from a lack of (ex-
ante) disclosure for insider sales, insufficient penalties for rules violations, and an 
inadequate delisting regime for failed penny stocks. Therefore, we investigate whether a 
stock market’s institutional structure is one of the factors influencing whether its listed 
firms survive. Using propensity score matching, we select a comparable sample from 
official markets to match the characteristics of firms in new markets and compare the  two 
groups’ survivability, after controlling for several accounting variables, such as leverage, 
auditor reputation, and profitability. Our results suggest that listing on a new stock market 
nearly doubles IPO firm failure compared with listing on long-established stock markets. 
This finding suggests that the institutional legitimacy of newly-established stock markets is 
vulnerable and that this vulnerability alone exposes the IPO firm to additional risk of 
failure. 
Another finding of this chapter is that firms’ accounting characteristics have an 
impact on IPO firms’ survivability. We find that firms with Big-5 auditors and higher 
profitability have a lower probability of failure. Our results show that on average, IPO 
firms with Big-5 auditors have a 22% lower failure risk than those with non-Big-5 auditors. 
Further, profitable firms’ failure risk is two times lower than non-profitable firms. These 
14
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findings are consistent with those of Demers and Joos (2007), who argue that accounting 
characteristics play a significant role in IPO firms’ survivability. 
Chapter 4 examines the effects of standard-setters’ efforts to improve the quality of 
accounting information. The compulsory adoption, in 2005, of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in EU countries is one of the most influential actions taken by 
standard-setters in recent years. The main aim of this action is to improve the 
comparability and quality of accounting reports across EU countries. Researchers have 
investigated the consequence of IFRS/IAS adoption from several perspectives, and their 
empirical findings are mixed. For example, some studies find higher disclosure levels 
(Daske and Gebhardt, 2006), higher earnings quality (Barth et al., 2007), and lower cost of 
capital (Daske et al, 2008) after IFRS adoption. In contrast, other studies cannot conclude 
that IFRS/IAS adoption decreases cost of capital (Daske, 2006; Christensen et al., 2007).  
These apparent inconsistencies are caused mainly by differences in sample 
characteristics. Most studies to date study only voluntary adopters, and therefore suffer 
from two methodological problems: self-selection bias and omitted variables (Soderstrom 
and Sun, 2007). Self-selection bias arises as voluntary adopters choose IFRS in order to 
gain the economic benefits expected from this adoption. The omitted variables problem 
refers, among other things, to differences in firms’ external environments—e.g., legal and 
political origin, and financial market development—that influence the quality of 
accounting information. 
This chapter uses the event of compulsory IFRS adoption as our empirical context. 
This context mitigates the previously-mentioned methodological problems, as mandatory 
adoption can be viewed as a natural experiment which forced all firms to switch to IFRS at 
the beginning of financial year 2005 regardless of their incentives and external 
environments. In this context, we investigate whether adopting IFRS has an impact on the 
quality of accounting information. We consider the impact by examining IFRS adoption’s 
consequences for the quality of analyst forecasts. Equity analysts are among the most 
important and sophisticated users of financial reports. Their forecasts depend largely on 
15
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the disclosure level and quality of financial reports. We argue that changes in financial 
reporting standards are reflected in the quality of analyst forecasts. Therefore, we test 
whether compulsory IFRS adoption has increased the accuracy of analyst forecasts and 
decreased their dispersion.  
We find that the quality of analyst forecasts for EU-listed firms has increased since 
the adoption of IFRS in 2005. The results show that these firms’ analyst forecasts have 
become more accurate and less dispersed since 2005. We interpret these results as positive 
evidence of the effect of stock market regulators and accounting standards-setters on the 
quality of financial information. 
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Chapter 2: Industry Valuation Driven Earnings 
Management1 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The current earnings management literature has examined earnings management from 
either a transaction-specific or a firm-specific point of view. In their review of earnings 
management literature, Healy and Wahlen (1999) mention that firms manage their earnings 
when they raise capital, such as at the time of initial public offerings (IPOs) or seasoned 
equity offerings (SEOs), or when they need to meet analyst expectations or performance 
targets related to executive compensation schemes. However, these studies disregard the 
fact that market conditions, like economic growth and industry valuation, are not constant 
over time. Focusing on the latter, we hypothesize that industry valuation will influence 
managers’ decisions to engage in earnings management. This can provide an explanation 
as to why earnings management occurs more frequently in some periods than in others.  
Our study substantiates two streams of literature. This is accomplished first by 
providing evidence of industry effects on firms’ earnings management decisions. Firms in 
the same industry face similar market conditions and growth prospects. Prior studies 
provide evidence that these industry prospects affect firms’ financial decisions. Harford 
(2005) finds that merger waves occur in response to specific industry shocks that require 
large-scale reallocation of assets. Mackay and Phillips (2005) find that industry factors are 
important to firms’ capital structure decisions. Given the importance of such industry 
effects, we investigate the impact of industry valuation on earnings management and aim 
to provide more empirical evidence for how industry effects can influence firms’ decision 
making. 
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on Jiao, T., Mertens, G., Roosenboom, P., 2007, “Industry Valuation Driven 
Earnings Management”. ERIM Working Paper Series.  
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Second, our study provides new evidence about the relationship between stock 
market valuation and earnings management. Jensen (2004) argues that overvalued firms 
have incentives to sustain their overvaluation. Kothari et al. (2006) empirically test 
Jensen’s argument and find that overvalued firms’ discretionary accruals are much higher 
than those of firms with lower valuations. However, we differ from Kothari et al. (2006) in 
arguing that the level of industry valuation can influence the earnings management 
decisions of all firms in that industry, not only overvalued ones. This is because industry 
valuation level can change the benefits and costs of managing earnings for all firms in that 
industry. 
Our study shows how different boom and bust in any industry change managers’ 
incentives to manage earnings. We employ a large sample of U.S. firms taken from 
COMPUSTAT. The sample period covers twenty years, from 1985 to 2005.  We test our 
hypothesis by examining the association between industry valuation and four-quarter 
forecasts of aggregate current discretionary accruals of individual firms in the industry. 
Following the behavioral finance literature (Baker et al., 2004), we use market-to-book 
ratio to proxy for the valuation level.  
First, we find that after including the usual explanatory factors for earnings 
management, such as leverage, size, and performance, our measure for industry aggregate 
earnings management of each quarter remains significantly positively associated with the 
lagged industry market-to-book ratio. This result holds for both current and total 
discretionary accruals. In economic terms, this implies that one standard deviation increase 
in the industry valuation is associated with a significant increase of 2.4 cents in quarterly 
earnings per share for an average firm. Second, to exclude alternative explanations, we run 
several robust analyses, such as excluding high-tech firms and observations during bubble 
years. We continue to find a significant, positive association between aggregate current 
discretionary accruals and the industry market-to-book ratio.  
 This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses related literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes our data and construct variables. Section 
19
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2.4 presents our main results and analyzes their robustness. We then discuss our findings in 
Section 2.5. 
 
2.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
Firms make earnings management decisions after balancing the associated benefits with 
their costs. The underlying economic rationale for earnings management is that it increases 
when benefits outweigh the costs, and inversely, decreases if costs outweigh the benefits. 
Before analyzing the effects of industry valuation on earnings management, we start with a 
discussion of the relative benefits and costs.   
 
2.2.1. Benefits of Earnings Management 
 
Since Ball and Brown (1968), numerous studies have documented a positive association 
between earnings surprises and stock returns. This association gives managers an incentive 
to use earnings management to influence stock price. Prior studies have found evidence 
consistent with this argument. In their survey, Graham et al. (2005) report that CFOs’ main 
motivation for engaging in earnings management is to influence the firm’s stock price. 
Meanwhile, managers’ personal wealth is closely linked with stock price because of 
equity-based compensation and human capital (Murphy, 1999). In the end, stock price will 
decline if firms miss their analyst forecasts (Skinner and Sloan, 2002).  
Although incentives to use earnings management to influence stock price always 
exist, we argue that the extent to which stock prices react to earnings is positively 
associated with industry valuation. Veronesi (1999) investigates the effects of market 
fundamentals on investors’ response to firms’ earnings announcements. His analytical 
model demonstrates that investors will overreact to bad news when the market is 
performing well, but underreact to good news when the stock market is performing poorly. 
When this argument is applied at the industry level, it implies there is more severe 
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punishment for releasing disappointing earnings when the industry is expected to perform 
well than when it is expected to perform poorly. In addition, the benefits of meeting or 
exceeding earnings expectations are higher in good times than in bad. Therefore, earnings 
management has more appeal to managers when the industry valuation is higher.  This 
argument is consistent with that of Dyck and Zingales (2002, p. 85), who argue that 
“during a downturn, the valuation of a stock depends more on its liquidation value than on 
its future growth, making it less sensitive to news.” In sum, we argue that the benefits of 
earnings management are higher when the industry has a higher valuation. Rational 
managers will time earnings management according to the level of the industry valuation. 
 
2.2.2. Costs of Earnings Management 
 
2.2.2.1 Accruals Reversal 
 
Accrual reversal is one of the most important costs associated with earnings management 
(Marquardt and Wiedman, 2004). The decrease in future earnings as a result of accrual 
reversal is not only associated with negative stock price reactions (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998a 
and 1998b), but also constrains the flexibility of future earnings. For example, an early 
recognition of income can potentially increase earnings in the current period. However, 
this early recognition decreases the growth of future earnings and limits the room for 
earnings management in the future. Nonetheless, we argue that the costs of accrual reversal 
are negatively associated with industry valuation (i.e., the costs decrease in cases of higher 
or increasing industry valuation, and increase if industry valuation is lower or decreasing). 
Prior studies (Fischer and Merton, 1985; Lee, 1992) find that stock price can predict future 
economic performance. Based on this finding, we expect that managers tend to have an 
optimistic outlook on economic prospects and expect an industry to have increasing future 
cash flows when its average stock price increases. As a consequence, it is more likely for 
managers to believe that earnings management imposes fewer constraints on future 
reporting flexibility, because the reversal of accruals will be covered, at least partially, by 
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increasing cash flows in the future. Hence, the negative influence from accrual reversal 
will be mitigated. In the case of lower or decreasing average industry stock prices, the 
problem with reporting flexibility will be more severe if managers engage in earnings 
management. Large amounts of accruals applied in the current period will mean greater 
difficulty in avoiding the negative consequences of an accrual reversal (i.e., a decrease of 
future earnings), since cash flow will decrease during an economic downturn or recession. 
Therefore, we conclude that the costs associated with reporting flexibility change with 
industry valuation. High industry valuation offers managers greater reporting flexibility. 
 
2.2.2.2 The Probability of Detecting Earnings Management 
 
A challenge to our argument about accrual reversal might be that stock market participants 
can see through the components of earnings and thus detect accounting discretion. 
However, Sloan (1996) finds that outsiders’ probability of detecting earnings management 
is not high. Commensurately, we claim that this probability is likely even lower in the case 
of higher industry valuation.  
First, investors, especially individual investors, lack the ability to see through 
earnings management—for example, to distinguish cash flow and accruals. Sloan (1996) 
examines the information content of both accruals and cash flow. He finds that investors 
react to earnings rather than to either of these components. This result implies that 
investors might not be able to see through earnings and identify the driver behind changes 
in them. This implication is consistent with managers’ belief that earnings are a more 
important metric than cash flow for investors (Graham et al., 2005). Hence, we argue that a 
high industry valuation predicts growing future cash flow and thus leads investors to be 
(more) optimistic about a firm’s performance. In this case, it is easier for investors to 
believe a firm’s performance results are plausible even if they can be attributed to a higher 
level of earnings management. Conversely, a low industry valuation increases investors’ 
skepticism and makes them more suspicious of firms’ performance. 
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Second, several studies find that the probability that journalists will see through 
firms’ discretion is low when an industry performs well. The financial press plays a key 
role in communicating information about corporate performance between firms and 
investors. Dyck and Zingales (2002) argue that journalists are less motivated to discover 
negative news when stock market valuation is high because: (1) firms are prone to release 
good news and are very selective in what they disclose to journalists during stock market 
booms; and (2) in exchange for access to information from firms, journalists have 
incentive to report more positive news. This result is also consistent with that of Solt and 
Statman (1988). They find that news writers’ sentiments in the current period are 
positively related to the stock market return in the prior period. Based on these findings, 
we argue that industry valuation impacts the media’s effectiveness in communicating 
information and monitoring firms. Periods of high industry valuation make it less likely 
that the media will alert investors about negative information, such as earnings 
management. Hence, we propose that the probability that investors will detect earnings 
management is lower when stock market valuation is high. 
Combining the above arguments about the influence of industry valuation on the 
costs and benefits of earnings management, as well as the likelihood that earnings 
management will be detected, we predict that the incentives to engage in earnings 
management vary across time and are associated with aggregate levels of industry 
valuation: earnings management is expected to occur more frequently when industry 
valuation is high. Therefore, our main hypothesis is as follows: 
H 2.1: Industry valuation has a positive impact on the degree of earnings 
management in that industry. 
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2.3. Data and Variables Definition 
 
2.3.1. Sample Selection 
 
To construct our sample, we start with quarterly financial data of all COMPUSTAT firms 
appearing between 1950 and 2005. Following prior studies that find that equity offers can 
provide incentives for earnings management, we identify observations at the time of IPOs 
and seasoned equity offerings in our initial sample using SDC dataset. As SDC dataset 
covers only the period between 1970 and 2005, our sample had to be cut down to cover 
only that period. Next, we screen our sample by deleting 4,858 financial companies (those 
with an SIC code beginning with 6). Third, we use a cross-sectional modified Jones model 
to delete the observations which do not have enough data to estimate discretionary accruals. 
Fourth, we eliminate those with fewer than ten observations in order to estimate the 
coefficients of total accruals. Fifth, we exclude observations that have missing market 
values, missing or negative book values, or missing control variables. Finally, we delete 
the outliers by excluding the bottom and top 1% of every variable. From the first to the 
final step, we obtain 164,320 observations containing 9,065 companies from the third 
quarter of 1985 to the fourth quarter of 2004. The steps in the sample screening are shown 
in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 
Sample Criteria 
Table 2.1 presents the steps used to screen our initial sample. First, we screen this initial 
sample by eliminating non-U.S. stocks and financial companies (those with an SIC code 
beginning with 6). Second, we delete the observations that do not have enough data to 
estimate discretionary accruals. Third, we drop observations if there are fewer than ten 
observations to estimate the coefficients of total accruals. Fourth, we exclude observations 
that have a missing market value and book value, and other missing control variables. 
Finally, we delete the outliers by excluding the bottom and top 1% of every variable.  
Screening Steps No. of Obs. in Sample 
No. of Firms 
in Sample Sample Period 
Initial sample 1871232 22382 1970.1~2005.4 
    
Less:   Financial firms 1475632 17524 1970.1~2005.4 
    
Observations with less 
than  necessary data for 
Modified Jones model 
498315 15601 1972.3~2005.4 
    
Less than 10 
observations 382012 15267 1975.1~2005.4 
    
Missing control variables 178683 9354 1985.3~2004.4 
    
Top and bottom 1%  
outliers 164320 9065 1985.3~2004.4 
 
2.3.2. Earnings Management Measurement 
 
We use current discretionary accruals as the proxy for earnings management because 
current discretionary accruals are “the component most easily subject to successful 
managerial manipulation” (Teoh et al., 1998, p. 195). Prior audit quality research also 
argues that firms have the greatest discretion over current accruals (Becker et al., 1998). In 
contrast to discretionary accruals, current discretionary accruals do not include the portion 
of accruals that are associated with depreciation. Manzon (1992) and Hunt et al. (1996) 
find little evidence that firms manage depreciation to meet short-term earnings targets. As 
our analysis focuses on quarterly earnings management decisions, the quarterly frequency 
will be too short to use depreciation for earnings management. Therefore, responding to 
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the changes in quarterly industry valuation, managers probably first choose to manage 
accounts such as tax and current liabilities rather than depreciation. Thus, this study finds 
that current discretionary accruals will be a better measurement of the degree of earnings 
management.  
We compute the quarterly current discretionary accruals based on the method used by 
Matsumoto (2002). The total current accruals (TCAijtq) of firm i in two-digit SIC code j in 
quarter q of year t are computed as follows (Equation 2.1):  
)()( ijtqijtqijtqijtqijtq STDebtCLCashCATCA Δ−Δ−Δ−Δ=                        (2.1) 
Where    ijtqCAΔ  = change in current assets (Compustat item # 40) 
ijtqCashΔ  = change in cash and cash equivalent (Compustat item # 36) 
              ijtqCLΔ      = change in current liabilities (Compustat item # 49) 
           ijtqSTDebtΔ = change in debt included in current liabilities (Compustat item 
# 45) 
We use a second model to estimate current discretionary accruals (DCAijtq) and 
current nondiscretionary accruals (NDCAijtq). This model is similar to the modified Jones 
model. However, we exclude accruals associated with the growth of long-term assets since 
we are measuring the current portion of discretionary accruals. In addition, we add a 
dummy for the fourth quarter of every year because it is well established that accruals in 
the fourth quarter differ from those in other quarters (Matsumoto, 2002). 
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         (2.2) 
Where    ijtqREVΔ   = change in revenue (Compustat item # 2) 
               ijtqARΔ   = change in account receivable (Compustat item # 37) 
          4Qtr  = the fourth quarter dummy 
              1−ijtqA    = lagged total assets (Compustat item # 44) 
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We estimate Equation 2.2 for each firm-year using all firm quarters in that year in the 
same industry (two-digit SIC code). To get sufficient data for parameter estimations, firm 
years with fewer than ten observations are excluded. After estimating the parameters in 
Equation 2.2, we apply them to the same model and then get the estimation of NDCAijtq. 
The difference between TCAijtq and NDCAijtq is the estimation of current discretionary 
accruals (DCAijtq), as shown in the following equation (Equation 2.3):  
ijtqijtqijtq NDCATCADCA −=              (2.3) 
Industry current discretionary accruals are measured as the lagged asset weighted 
average of discretionary accruals of all firms in an industry. Equation 2.4 presents the way 
to calculate industry current discretionary accruals. 
∑
∑
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Where DCAjtq  = industry current discretionary accruals 
 
2.3.3. Stock Valuation Measurement 
 
In their review of behavioral corporate finance, Baker et al. (2004) suggest that market-to-
book ratio is the most often used proxy for stock valuation. This study also uses it as the 
proxy, and adopts the definition of market-to-book ratio set out by Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) and Gompers et al. (2003). According to this definition, a firm’s market value is 
calculated as the book value of assets (Compustat item #44) plus the market value of 
common stocks, less the sum of the book value of common equity (Compustat item #59) 
and balance sheet deferred taxes (Compustat item #79). The market value of common 
stocks is the product of outstanding shares (Compustat item #61) and the stock price at the 
end of the fiscal quarter (Compustat item #14). The book value of assets is defined as total 
assets (Compustat item #44). Market-to-book ratio is a ratio of a firm’s market value to its 
book value of assets. 
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The industry market-to-book ratio (MBjtq) is used as our proxy for stock market 
valuation at the industry level. It is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the market 
capitalization of all stocks in quarter q of year t in industry j to the sum of the book value 
of these stocks in the same period and same industry. 
∑
∑
=
i
ijtq
i
ijtq
jtq B
M
MB                                           (2.5) 
Where    Mijtq  = the market value of firm i in quarter q of year t in industry j  
         Bijtq  = the book value of firm i in quarter q of year t in industry j   
         MBjtq = the industry market-to-book ratio 
 
2.3.4. Control Variables 
 
Prior studies on earnings management have identified several factors that can influence 
earnings management decisions, so it is important for our study to control for these 
variables as well.  
Firm valuation (VALijtq-4): several studies (e.g., Degeorge et al., 1999, Burgstahler 
and Eames, 1998) argue that firms manage their earnings to meet stock market 
expectations and hence to sustain or increase their stock price. Jensen (2005) argues that 
overvalued equities count on their earnings to keep up the already-high valuation. Kothari 
et al. (2006) test Jensen’s overvaluation theory empirically and find evidence consistent 
with this theory. However, Hirshleifer et al. (2009) find that undervalued equities also have 
incentive to manipulate earnings upward in order to show a performance comparable to 
that of industry peers. Therefore, the impact of a firm’s stock market valuation on earnings 
management could be either positive or negative. We employ a market-to-book ratio at the 
individual firm level to proxy for the stock market valuation at the firm level. 
Demand for external financing (FreeCijtq-4): An ex-ante measure of the demand for 
external financing (FreeCijtq-4) is developed by Dechow et al. (1996), as seen in Equation 
2.6. They argue that the demand for external financing depends not only on how much 
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cash is generated from operating and investment activities, but also on the “stock” of funds 
already available within the firm. When firms have fewer “stock” of funds, there is a 
higher demand for external financing, and hence, more incentives to manage earnings. 
Since current assets are convertible to cash, they represent the firm’s “stock” of funds. We 
calculate the value of the ratio of current assets to cash from operations, less average 
capital expenditure. The inverse of this ratio indicates the number of years during which 
firms can fund their operations and investments through internal funding. Following 
Dechow et al. (1996), we use the inverted ratio (FreeCijtq-4) to measure the demand for 
external financing. FreeCijtq-4 is coded as 1 if it is less than -0.5, and as 0 otherwise. The 
expected relationship between earnings management and FreeCijtq-4 is positive. 
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Leverage (LEVijtq-4): Prior studies (such as Bowen et al. 1981; and Dechow et al. 
1996) use leverage to measure the debt covenant motivation for earnings management. 
Assuming that firms with more leverage are closer to debt covenant violation, these firms 
are more inclined to engage in earnings management. We use leverage to measure firms’ 
closeness to their potential debt covenant violation. Leverage is defined as total long-term 
debt (Compustat item #51) scaled by total assets (Compustat item #44).    
Size (SIZEijtq-4): Several studies find that larger firms have more potential for earnings 
management. Bartov (1993) argues that larger firms have more room for using asset sales 
to manipulate earnings. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) argue that larger firms face higher 
political costs and hence have stronger incentives to manage earnings in order to reduce 
the potential political risk. Francis et al. (1996) show similar results for asset write-offs. 
Hence, the expected sign of the influence of size on earnings management is positive. We 
use the natural logarithm of sales (Compustat Item #2) as the proxy of firm size.  
Performance (ROAijtq-4): Dechow et al. (1995, p. 193) show that accruals are 
correlated with not only the current performance, but also past performance. However, the 
(modified) Jones model only controls for current performance. Kothari et al. (2005) show 
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that models for estimating discretionary accruals are often mis-specified if they do not 
control for firms’ performance. Bowen et al. (2009) include ROA as a control variable 
when analyzing the relationship between earnings management and corporate governance 
variables. We use return on assets (ROAijtq) to proxy for firms’ performance and use 
ROAijtq as a control variable, where ROAijtq is defined as income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat Item #8), scaled by lagged total assets (Compustat Item #44). 
Equity Issue (IPOijtq+m, SEOijtq+m): Several studies (e.g., Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et al. 
1998) find that firms manage earnings upward before going public to attract investors. 
Similar income-increasing earnings management is found before seasoned equity offerings 
(Teoh et al. 1998b; Shivakumar, 2000). Lamont and Stein (2006) find that the scale and 
numbers of firms’ financial activities are positively associated with aggregate stock market 
valuation. Therefore, our study faces the challenge that results might be driven partially by 
equity offerings. To control for this alternative explanation, dummies for both IPOs 
(IPOijtq+m) and seasoned equity offers (SEOijtq+m) are introduced into the analysis. IPOijtq+m 
and SEOijtq+m stand for the IPO dummies and SEO dummies of company i in the quarter 
q+m of year t in the industry j, where m varies from -4 to 4. These dummies equal one for 
the four quarters before (m=[-4,0]) and after (m=(0, 4]) the quarter of either IPOs or 
seasoned equity offerings. 
Industry and Quarter dummies (Din, Dqtr): To control for unobservable factors, which 
are related to industry characteristics and might influence firms’ earnings management 
decisions, we introduce industry (two-digit SIC code) and quarter dummies. 
 
2.3.5. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics of the final sample appear in Table 2.2. To avoid the influence of 
outliers, we trim each variable at the first and 99th percentile. The mean of current 
discretionary accruals is 0.58%, and its median is 0.46%. The individual market-to-book 
ratio has a mean of 1.9875 and a median of 1.4189. The mean of the industry market-to-
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book ratio is 1.8712, and the median is 1.637. Comparing the mean of other control 
variables with those reported by Bowen et al. (2009), it appears that our sample has firms 
with a larger degree of earnings management, higher leverage, and smaller size. This result 
is not surprising, since Bowen et al. (2009) include only firms in the S&P 500, S&P 400 
mid cap, and S&P 600 small cap. The correlation matrix is reported in Table 2.3. 
Consistent with prior studies, total discretionary accruals have a positive relationship with 
free cash flows, firm size, and firm performance.  
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Table 2.2 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 presents the sample’s descriptive statistics, with current discretionary accruals as 
the dependent variable. DCAijtq is quarterly current discretionary accruals estimated from 
the modified Jones model. MBijtq-4 is industry market-to-book ratio with a four-quarter lag 
behind the quarter of DCAijtq. VALijtq-4, LEVijtq-4, FreeCijtq-4, SIZEijtq-4, and ROAijtq-4 represent 
individual firms’ market-to-book ratio, leverage, demand for external capital, size, 
performance, and risk, respectively. All have a four-quarter lag behind the quarter when 
the DCA is estimated. VALijtq-4  is defined as the book value of assets (Compustat item #44) 
plus the market value of common stocks, less the sum of the book value of common equity 
(Compustat item #59) and balance sheet-deferred taxes (Compustat item #79). The market 
value of common stocks is the product of outstanding shares (Compustat item #61) and the 
stock price at the end of the fiscal quarter (Compustat item #14). The book value of assets 
is defined as total assets (Compustat item #44). Market-to-book ratio is a ratio of a firm’s 
market value to the book value of its assets. LEVijtq-4 is a ratio of total long-term debt 
(Compustat item #51) to total assets (Compustat item #44).  FreeCijtq-4  is the absolute 
value of the ratio of current assets to cash from operations, except average capital 
expenditure. SIZEijtq-4 is defined as the natural logarithm of sales (Compustat Item #2) as 
the proxy of firm size. ROAijtq-4 is income before extraordinary items (Compustat Item #8), 
scaled by lagged total assets (Compustat Item #44). 
Variable 
Firm-
quarters Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
DCA ijtq 164320 0.0058 0.0046 0.0879 -0.5254 0.6222 
MBijtq-4 164320 1.8712 1.6370 0.7479  0.7520  6.0992  
VALijtq-4 164320 1.9875 1.4189 1.6869 0.5518 15.3904 
LEVijtq-4 164320 0.1745 0.1228 0.1856 0 0.9055 
FreeCijtq-4 164320 0.0753 0 0.2707 0 1 
SIZEijtq-4 164320 3.1286 3.1361 2.1979 -3.2968 8.3825 
ROAijtq-4 164320 -0.0088 0.0078 0.0638 -0.4764 0.1065 
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Table 2.3 
Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the correlation matrix of variables of the final sample.  
  DCA ijtq MBijtq-4 VALijtq-4 LEVijtq-4 FreeCijtq-4 SIZEijtq-4 ROAijtq-4 
DCA ijtq 1       
MBijtq-4 -0.0101 1      
VALijtq-4 0.0124 0.2661 1     
LEVijtq-4 -0.0083 -0.1624 -0.2085 1    
FreeCijtq-4 0.0059 -0.0515 0.0247 0.1653 1   
SIZEijtq-4 0.0173 -0.0917 -0.2131 0.2433 -0.1285 1  
ROAijtq-4 0.0478 -0.1397 -0.2191 0.0305 -0.2267 0.4042 1 
 
2.4. Empirical Tests and Results 
 
2.4.1. Main Results 
 
This section presents the results of our empirical analyses that test whether there is a 
relationship between industry market-to-book ratio and magnitude of earnings 
management at the industry level. In addition to controlling for the identifiable variables 
that affect firms’ earnings management decisions, we include time dummies to control for 
all time-related factors. However, similar with time dummies, the key independent variable, 
industry market-to-book ratio, changes over time. Therefore, in including both time 
dummies and the industry market-to-book ratio, we may face a colinearity problem. To 
avoid this problem, this study uses a two-stage analysis. The first stage explains earnings 
management by regressing it on the control variables, including leverage, size, 
performance, demand for external financing, equity issue dummies, time dummies, and 
industry dummies. Control variables, excluding dummy variables (equity issue, time, and 
industry dummies), have a one-year lag behind the period of earnings management. As a 
result, the error terms from the first-step regression contain the component of earnings 
management that is not explained by the variables in the first-stage regression. We then 
aggregate the error terms for each industry quarter. The aggregation is a proxy for the 
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unexplained portion of earnings management at the industry level and thus the dependent 
variable in our second-stage regression. The second stage uses a univariate regression to 
examine the association between unexplained earnings management in industry quarters 
and the four-quarter lagged industry market-to-book ratio. The coefficient estimated from 
this regression provides us with an estimate of industry valuation’s effect on that industry’s 
degree of earnings management.  
Equation 2.7 (see below) is the model we used in the first step of the regression, with 
current discretionary accruals as the dependent variable. Panel A of Table 2.4 shows the 
results based on this model. The coefficients of firm valuation, demand for external 
finance, and performance are in line with expectations. The signs of these coefficients are 
positive and significant at the 0.0001 level. The coefficient of firm size is positive and 
significant at the 0.1 level. This result is consistent with the argument that larger firms 
have more resources to manage earnings. For brevity’s sake, we do not report the 
coefficients of quarter and industry dummies. The overall R square of Model 2.7 is 1.40%, 
suggesting that much of the variation in discretionary accruals remains unexplained. 
However, we should bear in mind that this low R square is not surprising because our 
sample is not constructed to be conditional on special events, as, for example, in the case 
of equity offerings. Moreover, prior studies on earnings management, such as Kasznik 
(1999) and Xie et al. (2002), report similar levels of explanatory power in their models. 
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Where       DCAijtq = Current discretionary accruals estimated by modified Jones 
model 
   VALijtq-4 = Market-to-book ratio of individual firms 
   LEVijtq-4 = Leverage, the ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
   FreeCijtq-4 = Demand for external financing 
   SIZEijtq-4 = Firm size measured as ln(sales) 
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   ROAijtq-4 = Firm performance measured as return on assets 
   IPOijtq+m = IPO dummies 
   SEOijtq+m = Seasoned equity offer dummies 
Dqtr  = Quarter dummies 
    Din，  = Industry dummies 
After the first-stage analysis, we aggregate each industry’s error term by quarter and 
regress the aggregated error terms on the industry market-to-book ratio (see equation 2.8).  
jtqjtq
i
ijtq MB νλλε ++= −∑ 410                            (2.8) 
where        ∑
i
ijtqε              = Aggregated error terms from the first-stage analysis per 
industry 
4−jtqMB   = Lagged aggregate industry market-to-book ratio 
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Table 2.4 
Panel A of Table 2.4 presents the results of regression based on Equation 2.7, where the 
dependent variable is current discretionary accruals (DCAijtq) of firm i in industry j at the 
quarter q of year t. VALijtq-4, LEVijtq-4, FreeCijtq-4, SIZEijtq-4, ROAijtq-4, and RISKijtq-4 represent 
individual firms’ market-to-book ratio, leverage, demand for external capital, size, and 
performance, respectively. They all have a four-quarter lag behind the quarter in which 
DCAijtq is estimated. IPOijtq+m and SEOijtq+m are dummy variables for IPOs, and seasoned 
equity offerings from the four quarters before DCA is estimated to the four quarters after. 
The coefficients for quarter and industry dummies also are included in the regression but 
not reported here. Panel B of Table 2.4 presents the results of the second-stage regression 
based on Equation 2.8, where the dependent variable ∑
i
jtqε  is each industry’s quarterly 
aggregated error terms from the first step. The independent variable is the industry market-
to-book ratio, which is the measurement of industry valuation.   
Panel A: Results of First-Stage Analysis  
Variable Coefficient P-Value Variable Coefficient P-Value 
VALijtq-4 0.001 0.0001 IPO ijtq+3 0.0039 -0.0389 
LEVijtq-4 -0.0052 0.0001 IPO ijtq+4 0.0264 -0.0178 
FreeCijtq-4 0.0061 0.0001 SEO ijtq-4 0.0039 0.0003 
SIZEijtq-4 0.0002 0.092 SEO ijtq-3 0.0043 0.0005 
ROAijtq-4 0.0725 0.0001 SEO ijtq-2 0.0085 0.0047 
IPO ijtq-4 0.0002 0.979 SEO ijtq-1 0.0118 0.008 
IPO ijtq-3 -0.0075 -0.0417 SEO ijtq 0.0126 0.0087 
IPO ijtq-2 0.0199 -0.015 SEO ijtq-+1 0.0091 0.0051 
IPO ijtq-1 0.0035 -0.0322 SEO ijtq+2 0.0042 0.0002 
IPO ijtq -0.0017 -0.0432 SEO ijtq+3 0.0015 -0.0026 
IPO ijtq+1 -0.0242 -0.0646 SEO ijtq+4 0.0052 0.0011 
IPO ijtq+2 0.0178 -0.0226 Intercept 0.0433 0.39 
Overall R-sqrt 0.014       
No. of Observations 164320       
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Panel B: Results of Second-Stage Analysis  
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient p-value 
MBjtq-4 + 0.0014 0.0001 
Intercept  0.0053 0.0001 
Adjusted R-sqrt 0.007   
No. of observations 4549   
 
Table 2.5 
This table presents the statistics of variables in the second-stage analysis. 
Variable Industry Quarters Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
MBjtq-4 4549 1.5957 0.5361 0.752 6.0992 
 4549 0.0075 0.0086 -0.0335 0.0608 
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the second stage are presented in Table 2.5. 
Panel B of Table 2.4 presents the results of the second-stage analysis. The coefficient of 
the industry valuation from the second step is significantly positive, which is consistent 
with our hypothesis.2 These results show that after controlling for the usual suspects, the 
industry average valuation has a positive relationship with earnings management. The 
coefficient of the industry valuation is 0.0014, which is significant at the 0.0001 level. This 
result implies that one standard deviation increase in industry valuation leads to an 
increase of 0.08 percentage point in aggregated error terms, which is about 11% of its 
average value. To translate this result into earnings per share, we first calculate the 
quarterly average assets per share within each industry—the ratio of the sum of total assets 
to the sum of outstanding shares in each industry quarter. The mean assets per share in our 
sample is 30.06 dollars per share, which indicates that one standard deviation increase in 
industry market-to-book ratio will lead to an increase of about 2.4 cents (0.08% * 30.06= 
2.4) earnings per share. This result indicates that on average, firms inflate their earnings 
∑ −
i
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per share by 2.4 cents when the standard deviation of the industry market-to-book ratio 
increases by 1. In sum, our result suggests that industry valuation influences the degree of 
earnings management, especially the current component of accruals. 
 
2.4.2. Robustness Checks 
 
Most earnings management studies use total discretionary accruals to proxy for earnings 
management. Although total discretionary accruals are not the best proxy in the context of 
our analysis, we also examine the relationship between the industry valuation and 
discretionary accruals. Equation 2.9 shows the first stage of the analysis, with discretionary 
accruals as the dependent variable. In this stage, we still regress the firm-level 
discretionary accruals on the control variables, which have been examined by prior studies.  
The error terms from this analysis are assumed to represent the part not explained by the 
control variables. After the first-stage analysis, we aggregate the error terms for firms in 
the same industry of each quarter and regress the aggregated error terms on industry 
valuation in the second stage (Equation 2.10).  
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Where    DAijtq = Discretionary accruals estimated by modified Jones model 
jtqjtq
i
ijtq MB νλλε ++= −∑ 410                            (2.10) 
Table 2.6 presents the results of the analysis based on Equation 2.9. In Panel A of 
Table 2.6, except for the coefficient of firm valuation (VALijtq-4), the coefficients of other 
independent variables are similar to those in prior studies. The signs of these coefficients 
correspond with expectations. Panel B of Table 2.6 shows the result of equation 2.10. 
                                                                                                                                                  
2 A Wooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelation in panel data suggests that first-order autocorrelation 
exists in the current model. However, our results do not change qualitatively when using fixed-
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Table 2.7 presents the statistics of the variables in the second-stage analysis. The positive 
coefficient of the industry average market-to-book ratio indicates a positive relationship 
between industry valuation and earnings management, beyond the control variables. The 
coefficient of the industry valuation is 0.0027 and significant at the 0.0001 level. One 
standard deviation increase in the industry valuation leads to an increase of 0.14 
percentage points in aggregated error terms, which is about 16% of its average value. 
                                                                                                                                                  
effects regression with an AR(1) disturbance. 
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Table 2.6 
Panel A of Table 2.6 presents the results of regression based on Equation 2.9, where the 
dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DAijtq) of firm i in industry j at the quarter q 
of year t. VALijtq-4, LEVijtq-4, FreeCijtq-4, SIZEijtq-4, and ROAijtq-4 represent individual firms’ 
market-to-book ratios, leverage, demand for external capital, size, and performance, 
respectively. All have a four-quarter lag behind the quarter in which DAijtq is estimated. 
IPOijtq+m and SEOijtq+m are dummy variables for IPOs, and seasoned equity offers from the 
four quarters before DA is estimated to the four quarters after. The coefficients for quarter 
and industry dummies also are included in the regression but not reported here. Panel B of 
Table 2.6 presents the results of the second-stage regression based on Equation 2.10, where 
the dependent variable ∑
i
jtqε  is each industry’s quarterly aggregated error terms from the 
first step. The independent variable is the industry market-to-book ratio, which is the 
measurement of industry valuation.   
Panel A: Results of First-Stage Analysis  
Variable Coefficient P-Value Variable Coefficient P-Value 
VALijtq-4 -0.0005 0.0440 IPO ijtq+3 -0.0051 0.8640 
LEVijtq-4 0.0077 0.0010 IPO ijtq+4 0.0191 0.5270 
FreeCijtq-4 0.0078 0.0001 SEO ijtq-4 -0.0038 0.2370 
SIZEijtq-4 -0.0006 0.0001 SEO ijtq-3 0.0010 0.7630 
ROAijtq-4 0.1136 0.0001 SEO ijtq-2 0.0055 0.0850 
IPO ijtq-4 0.0000 0.9990 SEO ijtq-1 0.0063 0.0600 
IPO ijtq-3 0.0010 0.9760 SEO ijtq 0.0111 0.0010 
IPO ijtq-2 0.0303 0.3430 SEO ijtq-+1 0.0067 0.0520 
IPO ijtq-1 -0.0087 0.7800 SEO ijtq+2 0.0008 0.8220 
IPO ijtq -0.0307 0.4010 SEO ijtq+3 0.0038 0.2790 
IPO ijtq+1 -0.0335 0.3600 SEO ijtq+4 0.0087 0.0150 
IPO ijtq+2 0.0142 0.6580 Intercept 0.0677 0.4680 
Overall R-sqrt 0.029       
No. of Observations 127257       
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Panel B: Results of Second-Stage Analysis  
Variable Predicted Sign Coefficient p-value 
MBjtq-4 + 0.0027 0.0001 
Intercept  0.0043 0.0001 
Adjusted R-sqrt 0.004   
No of observations 4391   
 
Table 2.7 
This table presents the statistics of variables in the second-stage analysis. 
Variable Industry Quarters Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
MBjtq-4 4391 1.5909 0.5325 0.7520 6.0992 
 
4391 0.0086 0.0237 -0.0501 0.0847 
 
To exclude alternative explanations for the previous results, we conduct several 
sensitivity analyses. First, it is possible that our results are driven by high-tech firms 
because they use more stock-based compensation than other firms do. A higher level of 
stock-based compensation can create more incentives for firms to manage earnings. To 
control for these effects, we follow the definition of high-tech firms given by Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) and exclude them from our sample. We find that the relationship 
between industry valuation and earnings management is still significantly positive. This 
result shows that the positive association between industry valuation and earnings 
management is not driven by the high-tech sector. 
Second, during the stock market boom of the late 1990s, the likelihood of detecting 
earnings management was higher than in other periods. Accounting fraud cases may have 
increased investor scrutiny. Therefore, our results may be driven by the stock market 
bubble, such as in the years 1999 and 2000. To mitigate this effect, we exclude 
observations in 1999 and 2000 from our sample and re-run the analyses. The results 
remain significantly positive, indicating an association between industry valuation and 
earnings management. Hence, our results are not driven by bubble years. 
∑ −
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Third, we test our hypothesis using four-quarter lagged industry valuation because we 
assume that managers manage earnings by evaluating industry valuation levels for the 
same quarter in the previous year. To examine this assumption’s sensitivity in our results, 
we also test the relationship between earnings management and industry valuation for three 
quarters, two quarters, and one quarter ago. The results show that earnings management 
also has a positive relationship with the industry valuation with three-quarter lag, two-
quarter lag, and one-quarter lag. 
 
2.5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This study investigates the relationship between industry valuation and earnings 
management behavior. Previous academic research has investigated several capital market 
motivations for earnings management. However, most of these studies take the industry 
environment as constant and focus on earnings management motivated by firm-specific 
and transaction-specific factors. We argue that the industry valuation affects the expected 
payoff and cost of earnings management, and thus has an impact on earnings management. 
Our main hypothesis is that industry valuation has a positive impact on the degree of 
earnings management in an industry. 
We apply a two-stage empirical model to explore the association between industry 
aggregate earnings management and industry valuation. We use current discretionary 
accruals as our proxy for earnings management because it is “the component most easily 
subject to successful managerial manipulation” (Teoh et al., 1998, p. 195). Besides using 
current discretionary accruals, we also follow other earnings management studies and use 
discretionary accruals as another proxy for earnings management. After controlling for 
some usual incentives for earnings management, such as leverage, firm size, and firm 
performance, we find a significant positive relationship both between industry valuation 
and aggregate discretionary current accruals, and between industry valuation and aggregate 
discretionary accruals. The coefficients of control variables are also consistent with prior 
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studies. Therefore, we conclude that industry valuation is another motivation for earnings 
management. 
Despite its contribution, the current study has several limitations. The first is the 
shortened sample period due to data availability. This study relies on the length of the 
sample period to show the boom and bust of the industry cycle. Yet, due to data 
availability requirements, we lose data in the period from 1950 to 1970. The second 
limitation is the stock market valuation measure. A potential challenge to this study is our 
use of market-to-book ratio as our valuation measure.  Although after surveying behavioral 
finance literature, Baker et al. (2004) claim that market-to-book ratio is a usual proxy for 
valuation, many studies in finance and accounting use it to measure firms’ growth 
opportunities. This difference in interpreting market-to-book ratio raises the question of 
whether our findings are the result of firms’ growth opportunities. Just as McNichols (2000) 
finds that expected future growth (measured by analyst earnings growth forecast) is 
positively associated with the level of discretionary accruals, the current finding may 
reflect the relationship between growth opportunities (as measured by market-to-book ratio) 
and discretionary accruals. We argue that in theory, firms’ market value is determined not 
only by growth opportunities, but also by other factors, such as profitability, risk, and mis-
valuation. Therefore, the market-to-book ratio measures more than growth opportunities. 
However, we cannot decompose market-to-book ratio into growth opportunity-related and 
non-growth opportunity-related parts. Therefore, in future extensions of this work it may 
be worthwhile to control for analyst earnings growth forecast, although doing so may 
reduce the sample size greatly due to the sparseness of analyst earnings growth forecast 
observations. We leave these challenges to such future extensions.  
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Chapter 3: IPO Firm Failures and Institutional 
Linkages3 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Nearly twenty competing new stock markets opened their doors in twelve Western 
European countries between 1995 and 2005 (Posner, 2005). These stock markets copied 
the model of NASDAQ, with its low barriers to entry and tight disclosure rules, and had 
one common aim: to attract untested, early-stage, innovative, and high-growth ventures 
that, until then, had not been considered viable candidates for public equity financing in 
Europe. However, most new markets were not able to attract sufficient listings to sustain 
market interest, or suffered from inadequate rule enforcement. For example, insider trading 
scandals and accounting frauds tarnished the reputation of the Neuer Markt, once billed as 
Europe’s answer to NASDAQ (Burghof and Hunger, 2004). As a result, investor 
confidence quickly dwindled, as did many of the new stock markets themselves, with the 
closure of EuroNM Belgium in 2001, the German Neuer Markt in 2003, and the French 
Nouveau Marché in 2004.   
 In this chapter, we conjecture that the legitimacy of the stock market can be viewed 
as a contextual factor that impacts IPO firm failure. In their formative years, new stock 
markets themselves still have to build trust, reliability, reputation, and finally, legitimacy. 
Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as a generalized perception or assumption that 
an entity’s actions are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially-constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions. Institutional theorists argue that 
legitimacy-building is behind many decisions about institutional strategies (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), and that an institution’s acceptance and 
subsequent survival depend on attaining and maintaining support of the relevant 
                                                          
3  This chapter is based on Jiao, T., Roosenboom, P. & Giudici, G. “IPO Firm Failures and 
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stakeholders in its environment (Baum and Oliver, 1992; Ruef and Scott, 1998). A stock 
market’s institutional legitimacy can be considered particularly crucial because its 
“institutional capital” attenuates potential concerns among investors who invest in the 
stocks of high-growth ventures and because it co-determines continued access to funds and 
the social capital of the firms that list on it.   
This research contributes to the emerging literature that explains IPO firm failure 
from firm-level characteristics, such as accounting variables (Jain and Kini, 2000; Weber 
and Willenborg, 2003; Demers and Joos, 2007) or social capital (Fischer and Pollock, 2004; 
Gulati and Higgins, 2004; Cohen and Dean, 2005). To our knowledge, none of these 
existing studies explore the question of whether and how stock markets’ institutional 
legitimacy influences IPO firm failure. Investigation of institutional linkages’ effects on 
IPO firm failures is important for two reasons. First, with the exception of Baum and 
Oliver (1991, 1992), few empirical studies have examined the link between institutional 
legitimacy and firm survival prospects in general. We argue that IPO firms draw on the 
stock market’s “institutional capital,” and once the stock market’s institutional legitimacy 
is challenged, it can be expected to increase the possibility of IPO firm failure. However, 
to date there has been no attempt to examine whether the stock market’s institutional 
legitimacy has an impact on IPO firm failure Second, this chapter helps to explain how 
new institutional arrangements impact a firm’s chances of survival. Deciding which stock 
market to list on is an important business decision for firms because it is one of the factors 
determining their access to finance and social capital. Our analysis investigates whether 
managers’ listing decisions impact IPO firm failure. To this end, we compare IPO firm 
failure on Europe’s newly-established stock markets with that on Europe’s well-
established, official stock markets. This provides valuable insights to managers by 
showing how their listing decisions could potentially expose their firms to additional risk 
of failure.  
                                                                                                                                                  
Institutional Linkages.” 
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We consider the five largest new stock markets in Europe: the German Neuer Markt, 
the French Nouveau Marché, the Dutch NMAX, EuroNM Belgium, and the Italian Nuovo 
Mercato. Our key finding is that the IPO firm failure rate on Europe’s new stock markets is 
almost double the IPO firm failure rate on long-established, official stock markets in these 
countries. We attribute this difference to the challenged institutional legitimacy of the new 
stock markets in Continental Europe. In addition, consistent with other studies about IPO 
failure, we find that firms’ accounting characteristics—such as auditors’ reputations, 
leverage, and profitability—play significant roles in IPO firms’ survivability. Our results 
show that firms that suffer loss and employ non-Big-5 auditors have significantly lower 
survivability than other firms. 
The next section, 3.2, presents conceptual foundations and substantiates our main 
hypothesis. Section 3.3 discusses our data and methodology. This is followed by our 
results in section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes this chapter.  
 
3.2. Conceptual Foundations 
 
New stock markets face the critical question of how to establish institutional legitimacy.  
Institutional legitimacy is important, as both investors and companies that plan to list on 
the stock market may not fully understand the market’s nature and its conformity to 
established institutional rules. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) distinguish between cognitive and 
sociopolitical legitimacy. In this context, cognitive legitimacy refers to the spread of 
knowledge about a new stock market. Sociopolitical legitimacy refers to the process by 
which policy makers, investors, and the general public accept the stock market as 
appropriate and right, given existing norms and laws. 
Europe’s new stock markets for entrepreneurial firms in high-technology sectors were 
founded during the second half of the 1990s. Posner (2005) shows that these new stock 
markets present a remarkable turn in Europe’s history by which, beginning in 1995, the 
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financial elites suddenly became fervent advocates of improving capital market access for 
untested firms. However, until 1994, none of the leading European exchanges had any 
plans for new stock market segments. The sudden institutional change can be attributed to 
European Commission officials who proposed a pan-European copy of NASDAQ in June 
1994. This sparked a contest to become the leading center of entrepreneurial finance 
among national stock exchanges. In rapid succession, nearly twenty competing new stock 
markets were opened in twelve Western European countries.  
A central insight of institutional theory is that organizations become legitimate by 
adopting practices and behaving in ways that are considered appropriate by different 
groups of stakeholders (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Suchman, 
1995). Stock markets rest on a web of relations between financial intermediaries, 
(institutional) investors, and companies seeking capital (Posner, 2005), and compete in 
large part to attract global institutional investors. Because these institutional investors were 
familiar with the NASDAQ form, new Continental European stock markets perceived the 
NASDAQ model, with its low barriers to entry and tight disclosure rules, as the most 
efficient and legitimate way to organize a stock market for entrepreneurial companies 
(Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; Posner, 2005). The NASDAQ model’s tight disclosure rules 
were intended to induce self-selection of high-quality firms and to bridge the information 
gap between companies and investors. For example, companies listing on the German 
Neuer Markt had to provide information in English, quarterly reports, and accounts in 
accordance with international accounting standards (Leuz, 2003). Besides adopting the 
familiar NASDAQ model, Europe’s new stock markets also tried to create cognitive 
legitimacy by developing a high media presence through presenting listed companies and 
IPO candidates in special publications, advertising campaigns, a separate section in 
financial newspapers’ stock pages, and intensive public relations activities (Burghof and 
Hunger, 2004). Pollock and Rindova (2004) show how positive media coverage can indeed 
assist IPO firms to accumulate firm-level legitimacy. The new markets met with early 
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runaway success, with more than 600 companies listing on Continental Europe’s new 
stock markets until 2000 (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; Giudici and Roosenboom, 2004). 
These same stakeholders and actors can, however, also challenge institutional 
legitimacy when they believe that an institution’s practices or behavior are out of line with 
their expectations or broader norms of appropriateness (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach, 2006). 
This disapproval can take the form of public criticism and demands for change, or the 
withdrawal of support for an institution. The most common legitimacy challenges stem 
from single events, such as scandals. This is what happened to Continental Europe’s new 
stock markets, which were plagued by insider trading scandals and accounting frauds. The 
challenged institutional legitimacy could be attributed in part to design flaws in the new 
stock markets’ institutional setup. For example, Burghof and Hunger (2004) show that the 
original setup of Germany’s Neuer Markt suffered from a lack of (ex-ante) publicity for 
insider sales, insufficient penalties in the case of rules violations, and an inadequate 
delisting regime for failed penny stocks. German courts even barred the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange from delisting companies that were accused of fraud and insider trading. These 
companies, therefore, tarnished the Neuer Markt’s reputation. Institutional investors 
became wary of investing in entrepreneurial companies whose transparency was somewhat 
suspect, and withdrew their support for new markets.  
Institutions often take action to defend their legitimacy when it is in trouble (Ashforth 
and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman 1995). Defensive actions include the construction and 
dissemination of verbal accounts to explain, justify, excuse, or deny illegitimate actions 
(Elsbach 1994; Suchman 1995), or the restructuring of practices and policies criticized as 
illegitimate (Suchman, 1995; Elsbach, 2006). After the scandals, the stock exchanges tried 
to strengthen the requirements for admission to new markets. On the French Nouveau 
Marché, companies going public needed to have filed audited accounts for three fiscal 
years and an income statement showing a pre-tax profit for the preceding twelve months, 
but the new rules only came into effect in 2003. When stock prices on the Neuer Markt 
collapsed, due largely to scandals rooted in poor compliance with the disclosure rules, the 
48
Chapter 3: IPO Firm Failures and Institutional Linkages 
40 
Frankfurt Exchange redoubled its enforcement efforts (Financial Times, July 23, 2000). In 
2001 the German government proposed a Financial Market Promotion Act that was 
designed to improve investor confidence in the country’s equity market by making 
companies liable for damages if they provided false or misleading ad hoc announcements, 
or if they did not make announcements about market-sensitive information on a timely 
basis. However, it was a case of too little too late. Introducing new rules to close the gaps 
ex post facto sent an ambivalent signal. It was understood as a sign of the defectiveness of 
the entire system, which seemingly had been constructed to deceive investors (Burghof 
and Hunger, 2004). The hasty adoption of the NASDAQ model had not been accompanied 
by changes in legal investor protection, and therefore lacked institutional legitimacy. 
Although the early runaway success of the new stock markets had resulted in more 
widespread share ownership, the laws protecting shareholders’ interests had not kept pace. 
The German Neuer Markt closed in 2003, and the French Nouveau Marché followed in 
2004.  
This chapter argues that the new stock markets’ (lack of) institutional legitimacy 
influences IPO firm failure. Previous studies show that new ventures’ probability of 
survival is rather limited (Freeman et al., 1983). Stinchcombe (1965) dubbed this 
phenomenon the “liability of newness,” and argued that new ventures’ resource poverty, 
lack of legitimacy, and weak ties to external actors provide them with reduced capacity 
when they compete with established firms. Therefore, for survival and growth, it is crucial 
for entrepreneurial firms to have continued access to three kinds of resources: social, 
financial, and operational/productive (Rao, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Access to finance has 
been widely shown to particularly influence entrepreneurial firms’ chances of survival 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Martin and Justis, 1993; Mudambi and Treichel, 
2005). It is exactly this access to financial resources that may be jeopardized when the 
stock market’s institutional legitimacy is challenged and investors lose confidence.  
Entrepreneurial firms acquire at least part of their organizational legitimacy from 
their ties with legitimate actors and institutions (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Carter and 
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Manaster, 1991; Podolny, 1994; Fischer and Pollock, 2004; Gulati and Higgins, 2004; 
Cohen and Dean, 2005). Reputable actors and institutions that are willing to certify the 
quality of the firm going public confer external legitimacy on it through their association. 
Therefore, the firm’s organizational legitimacy is derived from its relationships with other 
legitimate organizations and actors who are a valuable source of social capital (Portes, 
1998). In the context of IPOs, three actors have been found to enhance the social capital of 
firms going public: underwriters (Carter and Manaster, 1990), auditors (Titman and 
Trueman, 1986; Michaely and Shaw, 1995; Weber and Willenborg, 2003), and venture 
capitalists (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Fischer and Pollock, 2004). Previous research has 
found that investors look at these reputable actors as cognitive anchors and that these 
actors help to decrease the likelihood of IPO firm failures (Demers and Joos, 2007; Fischer 
and Pollock, 2004). Building on this research, we argue that stock markets themselves can 
also act as legitimate institutions which endorse the quality of firms going public. We 
argue that a challenge to a stock market’s institutional legitimacy negatively impacts all 
firms that list on it, since they draw part of their organizational legitimacy from the stock 
market’s institutional capital. Hence, we conjecture that the stock market’s institutional 
legitimacy is inversely related to IPO firm failures.  
H3.1: A stock market’s institutional legitimacy is inversely related to IPO firm failure. 
 
3.3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.3.1. Sample Description 
 
Our initial sample consists of all IPO firms in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Italy for the period of 1996 to 2000. This period starts with the opening of the 
Nouveau Marché in France. We exclude 65 IPO firms on new markets that fail to meet 
official stock markets’ criteria for firm age and size. The listing requirements of both new 
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and official stock markets in Europe can be found in the Appendix.4 Most IPO firms, 
therefore, had the opportunity to list on both the new and official stock markets in their 
country. Our final sample comprises 509 new market IPOs and 452 official market IPOs. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the distribution of IPOs in each stock market. In terms of IPO 
numbers, the largest new stock markets are in France, Germany, and Italy. With the 
exception of Germany, official stock markets had more IPO activities than new stock 
markets. In particular, in France, the Second Marché had 174 IPOs from 1996 to 2000. 
This market was set up for small firms, though it has higher admission criteria for initial 
entry than the Nouveau Marché does.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Although in principle loss-making firms are not allowed to be listed in official markets, these 
markets allowed some deviations in order to attract new-economy firms during our sample period. 
Therefore, in our sample, 16 IPO firms listed on an official market had loss-making history. 
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Table 3.1 
Sample Distribution 
This table displays the firm distribution of different stock exchanges. 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total 
Official Stock Markets   
Germany  Amtlicher Handel 5 10 15 28 14 72 
 Geregelter Markt 4 3 9 9 6 31 
France  Premier Marché 2 2 4 4 13 25 
 Second Marché 29 36 68 27 14 174 
Italy  Mercato Principale 12 10 15 21 12 70 
Netherlands  Officiële Markt 4 9 10 13 5 41 
Belgium  Eerste Markt 1 11 13 10 4 39 
 Total Official Markets 57 81 134 112 68 452 
New Stock Markets   
Germany  Neuer Markt 0 10 42 129 132 313 
France  Nouveau Marché 14 17 40 31 44 146 
Italy  Nuovo Mercato 0 0 0 4 24 28 
Netherlands  NMAX 0 1 3 1 0 5 
EuroNM in 
Belgium Euro.NM Belgium 0 2 6 6 3 17 
  Total New Markets 14 30 91 171 203 509 
 
3.3.2. Empirical Methods 
 
This chapter examines whether the choice of stock market is a determinant of IPO 
firm failure. To measure this effect, we compare the failure rates of firms listed on official 
markets to those of firms listed on the new markets. However, the comparison between 
these two groups is only unbiased when IPO firms on the new markets are comparable to 
those listed on the official markets. Therefore, we use propensity score matching 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Villalonga, 2004; Li and Zhao, 2006), a technique that can 
identify a sub-sample from IPO firms on official markets with a similar propensity to be 
listed on the new markets as the IPO firms that actually chose to list on new markets. We 
measure this probability based on a range of ex-ante IPO firm characteristics.  
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3.3.2.1. Propensity Score Matching  
 
We use a logistic model to identify a group of official market IPO firms that have similar 
firm characteristics, and therefore, a similar probability to be listed on a new market as that 
of the new market IPO firms. The dependent variable is a dummy variable (List_choice), 
which equals 1 if firms are listed on new markets and 0 if companies are listed on official 
markets. Equation (3.1) presents our logistic model:   
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where i denotes IPO firm i listing on either official markets or new markets,  p is the 
probability for an IPO firm to be listed on a new stock market, and ε denotes the error term. 
We refer to Table 3.2 for variable definitions.  
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Table 3.2 
Variable Definition 
Variable  Description Measure 
list_choice Listing choice dummy 1 if a firm decides to list on one of the new markets, 0 otherwise 
size Firm size Natural log of total assets 
age Firm age Natural log of one plus firm age 
cash Pre-IPO cash position Natural log of cash before IPO scaled by total assets 
loss Profitability 1 if the firm’s net income is positive, 0 otherwise 
lev Leverage The ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
part Participation ratio The number of secondary shares sold relative to pre-IPO shares outstanding  
initial_return First-day return Closing price on the IPO date less offer price as % of offer price 
vc_back Venture capital dummy 1 if IPO is backed by venture capital, 0 otherwise 
insider_post Ownership of insiders after the IPO 
Post IPO stake of insiders, including 
CEO, executive directors, non-executive 
directors, families, employees 
underwriter Underwriter reputation Underwriter’s market share within a country 
auditor Auditor reputation 1 if the auditor firm is one of the Big-5, 0 otherwise 
weight_lock Average lock-up period 
weighted average length of the total 
lockup agreement of single largest post-
IPO shareholder; weights are % of 
shareholdings locked   
hot_issue Hot issue period 
market buy-and-hold returns during a 90 
trading day interval before IPO (ending 1 
day before IPO date) 
internet Internet firms 
1 if a firm is from Internet industry, 0 
otherwise. Defined by Knauff et al. 
(2003). 
high_tech High-tech firms 
1 if a firm is from high-tech industry, 0 
otherwise. Defined by Loughran and 
Ritter (2004). 
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 We choose a range of firm characteristics based on the main differences in admission 
criteria between official and new markets. First, new markets’ admission criteria allow 
younger and smaller companies to go public. Therefore, the first two variables we include 
in the logistic regression model are age (measured as the natural log of one plus age) and 
size (measured as the natural log of total assets). We thus expect that younger and smaller 
firms are more likely to go public on new markets. 
Secondly, we include the participation ratio (part). The participation ratio is 
measured as the number of existing shares sold by the pre-IPO shareholders at the time of 
the IPO expressed as a percentage of the outstanding shares before the IPO. The new 
markets’ admission requirements stipulate that half of the offered shares at the time of the 
IPO must be newly issued by the company. Hence, shareholders who want to sell shares at 
the time the firm goes public are better off opting to go public on the official markets, 
where these IPO rules do not apply.  
We also include other variables that previous studies have shown to be the main 
characteristics of IPO firms on new stock markets (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002; Giudici and 
Roosenboom, 2004). The model incorporates a loss dummy (loss) and a venture capital 
backing dummy (vc_back). Giudici and Roosenboom (2004) compare the characteristics of 
new market firms with those of official market firms. They report that on new markets, a 
significantly larger number of less profitable and even loss-making firms go public, and a 
larger fraction of firms are backed by venture capitalists. Our model also includes the 
amount of cash on the pre-IPO balance sheet (cash). Given the easier access to new stock 
markets, it is more likely that cash-constrained firms tap them. Therefore, cash-constrained 
firms are more likely to go public on new stock markets. Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) 
report that the composition of new market firms is more concentrated in Internet and high-
tech industries. Therefore, our model also incorporates an internet dummy (internet) and 
high-tech dummy (high_tech). Finally, we include the market buy-and-hold returns during 
a 90-trading-day interval before the IPO (hot_issue). It is more attractive for firms to go 
public when the stock market as a whole is performing well and investors are more 
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interested in buying stocks. This is especially true for young startup firms, which are more 
inclined to list on new markets than on official markets.  
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the logistic 
regression. The logit model includes 29 firms (17 new market firms and 12 official market 
firms) with missing data on one or more of the variables. This leaves 932 observations 
included in the logistic regression. For completeness, we include the descriptive statistics 
for both the untransformed and log-transformed variables. 
Table 3.4 shows the results of logistic regression, which explains the propensity to 
list on Europe’s new stock markets. Except for hot_issue, the coefficients of the other 
independent variables are significant. We find that younger, smaller, and more cash-
constrained firms are more likely to list on new markets. The results also show that loss-
making firms and firms with venture capital backing are more likely to be listed on new 
stock markets than official stock markets. Both Internet firms and high-tech firms tend to 
be listed on new markets. 
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Table 3.3 
Descriptive Statistics of Firms Used in the Logit Estimation 
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the logistic 
regression. The second half of the table shows the sample statistics after taking the 
logarithm of Age, Size and Cash. 
 Observations Mean Std. dev. Median Min Max 
Age 932 24.473 35.737 13.000 1.000  527.000  
Size 932 955.574 9218.548 20.459 0.005  216230.500  
Cash 932 115.754 1761.239 2.172 0.000  45535.460  
Participation 932 0.121 0.136 0.090 0.000  0.906  
Loss 932 0.160 0.367 0.000 0.000  1.000  
Hot_issue 932 0.093 0.142 0.075 -0.228  0.552  
Vc_back 932 0.401 0.490 0.000 0.000  1.000  
Internet 932 0.122 0.328 0.000 0.000  1.000  
Tech 932 0.352 0.478 0.000 0.000  1.000  
Logistic regression variables      
Propensity 
_score 932 0.528 0.337 0.546 0.000  0.998  
LogAge 932 2.739 0.940 2.639 0.693  6.269  
LogSize 932 3.345 1.936 3.018 -5.292  12.284  
LogCash 932 -2.633 1.859 -2.415 -13.428  6.146  
Participation 932 0.121 0.136 0.090 0.000  0.906  
Loss 932 0.160 0.367 0.000 0.000  1.000  
Hot_issue 932 0.093 0.142 0.075 -0.228  0.552  
Vc_back 932 0.401 0.490 0.000 0.000  1.000  
Internet 932 0.122 0.328 0.000 0.000  1.000  
Tech 932 0.352 0.478 0.000 0.000  1.000  
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Table 3.4 
Logit Estimation: 
 Prediction of Propensity Score to Be Listed on a New Stock Market 
Table 3.4 shows the results of logistic regression, which explains the propensity to list on 
Europe’s new stock markets. 
Variable Coefficient Std. error z-statistic P>|z| 
LogAge -0.415 0.124 -3.360 0.001  
LogSize -0.639 0.073 -8.800 0.000  
LogCash -0.097 0.054 -1.800 0.072  
Participation -5.405 0.909 -5.950 0.000  
Loss 0.845 0.348 2.430 0.015  
Hot_issue 0.245 0.616 0.400 0.690  
Vc_back 0.623 0.190 3.280 0.001  
Internet 1.545 0.519 2.980 0.003  
Tech 1.308 0.202 6.480 0.000  
Intercept 2.824 0.417 6.780 0.000  
No.of observation 932    
Log likelihood -389.172    
Prob > chi2 <0.000    
Pseudo R2 0.396       
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Applying the regression coefficients from the logistic regression, we estimate the 
likelihood of each IPO firm to be listed on the new market. Based on these estimated 
propensity scores, we identify a matching official market IPO firm for each of the new 
market IPO firms. In particular, we locate a comparable official market IPO firm with a 
propensity score with a difference less than 0.01 from that of the new market IPO firm. We 
allow matching with replacement, in order to match each firm from the official market 
sample with multiple firms from the new market sample as long as the distance between 
their propensity scores is smaller than 0.01. The replacement condition is an accepted 
technique when the control sample includes a smaller number of observations. For twelve 
new market firms we cannot find an appropriate match.5  
The remaining 480 new market firms are matched with 138 official market firms. 
About 50% of the 138 official market firms are uniquely matched to one new market firm, 
and about 78% of the 138 official market firms are matched to less than three new market 
firms. Unreported results show that the propensity scores of official market firms are 
similar to those listed on the new markets. Both new market firms and the matched official 
market firms had similar firm characteristics, and therefore, a similar propensity to go 
public on Europe’s new stock markets.  
 
3.3.2.2.  Cox Proportional Hazard Regression Model 
 
In survival tests, we compare the failure rates of 480 new market firms with those of the 
138 matched official market firms. Hence, our survivorship test does not allow for multiple 
matches. This allows for an unbiased estimation of IPO failure rate and an unbiased 
comparison of IPO firm failure between new and official stock markets.  Firms included in 
                                                          
5 Caliper matching first identifies firms under common support with a criterion of 0.01 units of 
propensity score. This step eliminates new market firms, whose propensity score is higher than the 
highest propensity score of official market firms by more than 0.01, and whose propensity score is 
lower than the lowest propensity score of official market firms by more than 0.01. Twelve new 
market firms are not under common support. 
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our survivor test thus meet two conditions: (1) they have an option to go public on a new 
market or an official market, and (2) they have similar firm characteristics, and therefore, a 
propensity to list on the new markets.  
Prior studies have defined IPO failure in different ways. Demers and Joos (2007) 
define a firm’s failure as delisting from the stock market, excluding transfers to another 
stock exchange, acquisitions, and going private transactions. This definition limits the 
sample to firms which fail and are removed from stock exchanges. However, new stock 
markets in Europe had the difficulty of not being able to remove failing penny stocks with 
little trading volume (Hunger and Burghof, 2004). We define IPO firm failure as the time 
it takes for an IPO firm’s share price to drop below 10% of its IPO price. This definition is 
more general and includes failed firms that were delisted.  
We use a Cox proportional hazard regression to further test whether institutional 
linkages influence the time to IPO failure, while controlling for other factors’ effects. This 
method is often applied in the IPO firm failure literature (e.g., Jain and Kini, 2000). For 
more information about the method, we refer to Cox (1972). Equation 3.2 shows the Cox 
hazard model, in which we estimate: 
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where i denotes a sample firm i, which could be listed on either official or new markets. 
)(
)(
0 tH
tH is the hazard ratio, which shows the risk for a new market IPO firm to fail at time t 
relative to the failure risk of its official market counterpart. We refer to Table 3.2 for 
variable definitions. List_choice is our key independent variable. It is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when firms opt to be listed on one of the new markets, and is 0 otherwise. This 
variable is used in the Cox regression to show whether firms that opt to list on a new 
market have a higher failure rate than those that choose to list on official markets. Hence, 
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this variable tests our hypothesis that the stock market’s institutional legitimacy is 
inversely related to IPO firm failure, controlling for other factors that we outline below.  
We also include a set of control variables. Table 3.2 shows variable definitions, and 
Table 3.5 shows the descriptive statistics.  
Table 3.5 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms Used in the Cox Proportional Hazard Regression 
This table presents the statistics for the sample used in the Cox proportional hazard 
regression.  
  No. of Obs. Mean SD Median Min Max 
list_choice 614 0.779 0.416 1.000 0.000  1.000  
age 614 14.041 13.643 10.000 1.000  128.000  
LogAge 614 2.428 0.739 2.398 0.693  4.860  
size 614 50.558 219.462 12.884 0.005  3921.361  
LogSize 614 2.625 1.429 2.556 -5.292  8.274  
loss 614 0.231 0.422 0.000 0.000  1.000  
lev 614 0.318 0.348 0.258 -0.270  6.676  
part 614 0.080 0.089 0.063 0.000  0.508  
insider_post 614 0.480 0.245 0.538 0.000  0.900  
vc_back 614 0.459 0.499 0.000 0.000  1.000  
lockup 614 11.364 11.110 10.570 0.000  66.979  
initial_return 614 0.359 0.619 0.125 -0.300  4.444  
underwriter 614 0.040 0.061 0.011 0.000  0.253  
auditor 614 0.534 0.499 1.000 0.000  1.000  
internet 614 0.179 0.384 0.000 0.000  1.000  
tech 614 0.477 0.500 0.000 0.000  1.000  
hot_issue 614 0.087 0.142 0.069 -0.228  0.427  
 
We control for age differences by including the natural logarithm of 1 plus firm age 
(age) in the Cox regression model. Older firms have passed the test of time and have an 
established track record. Therefore, they are less likely to fail in the post-IPO period. We 
also control for the natural logarithm of total assets (size). Firm size is a proxy for firms’ 
position in the market. Larger firms’ economic scale enables them to have lower costs and 
higher market share. Therefore, they have a lower risk of failure (Schultz, 1993; Hensler et 
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al., 1997).  Demers and Joos (2007) consider profitability as one of the accounting 
predictors of IPO failure. They use gross margin percentage as the proxy for profitability 
and find a significant negative relationship between gross margin percentage and IPO 
failure rate. However, most European IPO firms do not report costs of goods. Without this 
necessary item to calculate gross margin, we choose to use loss dummy (loss) as the proxy 
for profitability. This dummy is 1 when firms have a negative net income and 0 otherwise. 
Given this definition, we expect a positive coefficient for this variable. 
Leverage is a widely-used predictor of firm failure in non-IPO settings (Ohlson, 1980; 
Shumway, 2001). Consistent with these studies, our analysis includes leverage as a control 
variable. It is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets (lev). We use the 
participation ratio (part) as a measure of pre-IPO shareholders’ belief in firms’ outlook. 
This ratio is calculated as secondary shares sold at IPO to shares outstanding pre-IPO. 
Fewer shares sold during IPO show pre-IPO shareholders’ confidence in firms’ potential 
for value improvement in the post-IPO period. In turn, it is less likely for these IPO firms 
to fail (Jain and Kini, 1994). insider_post is the insider ownership post-IPO. Insiders 
include CEO, executive directors, non-executive directors, families, and employees. 
Ownership helps to align the interests of managers and shareholders, and thus mitigates the 
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In addition, insiders have more information 
about IPO firms than that conveyed in IPO prospectuses. The higher insider ownership in 
the post-IPO period signals insiders’ belief in IPO firms’ prospects. Therefore, insider 
ownership can be a potential candidate for predicting IPO firm failure (Mikkelson and 
Partch, 1997; Demers and Joos, 2007).  
Another signal relates to the period during which the CEO has agreed not to sell his 
shares in the period following the IPO. This so-called lockup period (lockup) is calculated 
as the number of months for which the CEO has agreed not to sell his shares. This 
requirement aims at avoiding excess supply of shares in the aftermarket (which could 
depress stock price) and at preventing insider trading (Brav and Gompers, 2003). If no 
lockup period is in place, pre-IPO investors could sell their shares to take advantage of 
62
Chapter 3: IPO Firm Failures and Institutional Linkages 
54 
temporarily overoptimistic valuation. By committing to the lockup period, these pre-IPO 
shareholders signal their confidence in the future. Therefore, the lockup period is expected 
to be negatively related to IPO firm failure.  
Prior studies (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Jain and Kini, 1995; Brav and Gompers, 
1997) find that IPO firms that are backed by venture capitalists display lower initial return 
and better long-term performance. In addition, Jain and Kini (2000) find that IPO firms 
that are backed by a venture capitalist have a higher survival profile than those without 
such backing. Therefore, we include a venture capital backing dummy (vc_back) that is 
equal to 1 if a venture capitalist owns shares in the IPO firm, and is 0 otherwise.  
Based on Rock’s (1986) model, Beatty and Ritter (1986) demonstrate a monotonic 
relation between underpricing and investors’ uncertainty about IPO value. Therefore, we 
expect that a positive relation between IPO underpricing and failure rate can be predicted. 
We define underpricing (initial_return) as the percentage of the difference between the 
offer price and the closing price on the first day of trading. 
Given the limited pre-IPO information available to investors, the quality and the 
opinion of experts involved in IPO process become important information sources for 
investors. IPO firms can enhance their social capital from their ties to reputable 
underwriters (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Schultz, 1993; Carter et al., 1998; Demers and 
Joos, 2007) and auditors (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Michaely and Shaw, 1995; Weber 
and Willenborg, 2003). We expect a negative relationship between these actors’ 
reputations and IPO firm failure. We measure underwriter prestige (underwriter) as the 
underwriter’s market share in the IPO market of its home country, and we measure auditor 
reputation as a dummy variable (auditor) that takes the value 1 if the auditor belongs to the 
top five audit firms, and is 0 otherwise.  
We also control for industry differences. In particular, we include an Internet 
(internet) dummy and a high-tech (high_tech) dummy variable that are equal to 1 if IPO 
firms belong to the Internet or the high-tech industry, respectively.  Prior studies (Ibbotson 
and Jaffe, 1975; Lowry and Schwert, 2002) find hot issue periods during which investor 
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demand is high, resulting in high initial returns and an increase in the number of firms 
going public. During such periods, it is easier for lower-quality firms to go public. These 
firms are more likely to fail in the long run. We use stock market returns during a 90-
trading-day interval before IPO as our proxy for hot issue periods (hot_issue). 
 
3.4. Results 
 
3.4.1. Plots of Survival Functions 
 
We construct survival functions for both new market IPO firms and the matched official 
market IPO firms using the Kaplan-Meier estimation. Figure 3.1 shows the plot of the 
survival functions of new market firms and official market firms. Both groups start with a 
100% survival rate at the time of IPO (year 0). After that point, the number of survival 
firms in both groups drops gradually. At year six, more than 65% of official market firms 
trade above 10% of their IPO price. In contrast, after six years only about 45% of new 
market IPO firms still trade above 10% of their IPO price. At the same time, during the 
whole period, the plotted survival function of the new market IPO firms is always below 
that of the matched official market firms, and the difference between these two is 
significant at 1 percent level. This result provides preliminary evidence that although both 
groups of IPO firms have an equal propensity to list on the new markets, those that 
actually do list on these markets display a significantly lower survival rate.  
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3.4.2. Survival Analysis 
 
Table 3.6 presents the results of the Cox proportional hazard regression. Consistent with 
our argument, the coefficient of our independent variable, market choice (list_choice), is 
significantly positive. This result suggests that if firms have a similar probability to be 
listed on a new market, the choice to actually list on the new market is associated with 
almost double the failure rate compared to those listing on official markets. In particular, 
new market IPO firms have a failure rate 2.18 times higher than that of matched official 
market IPO firms.  
The regression coefficients of the loss-making dummy, participation ratio, venture 
capital backing dummy, underwriter prestige, and Internet industry dummy are statistically 
significant. As expected, the loss and Internet dummies are shown to have a positive 
impact on IPO firm failure. Loss-making firms have twice the potential for IPO failure of 
profitable firms. Firms from the Internet industry are 1.82 times more likely to fail in stock 
markets than firms from other industries. However, high-tech firms do not have 
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Survival Distribution Function Stratified by Stock Markets 
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significantly higher failure rates than other firms. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Stultz, 
1993; Demers and Joos, 2007), our results show that hiring prestigious underwriters and 
reputable auditors can lower firms’ IPO failure rate. A one standard increase in 
underwriter’s market share decreases an IPO firm’s failure rate by about 5%. IPO firms 
with auditors that belong to the top five audit firms have 22% lower risk of failure than 
IPO firms with less reputable auditors. This result shows that reputable actors enhance an 
IPO firm’s social capital and thereby improve its survival prospects. Our analysis shows 
that the participation ratio has a negative impact on IPO firm failure. A one standard 
deviation increase in the participation ratio correlates with a 7% lower IPO firm failure.  
Table 3.6 
Cox Proportional Hazard Regression of the Time to Fail 
This table presents the results based on the Cox Proportional Hazard Regression based on 
Equation 3.2. 
  Hazard ratio 
Standard 
error z-statistic P>|z| 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
List_choice 2.184 0.401 4.260 0.000 0.421  1.141  
Logage 0.917 0.082 -0.980 0.328 -0.262  0.088  
LogSize 0.962 0.041 -0.920 0.356 -0.122  0.044  
Loss 2.012 0.287 4.910 0.000 0.420  0.978  
Lev 0.957 0.183 -0.230 0.816 -0.419  0.330  
Participation 0.181 0.134 -2.300 0.021 -3.159  -0.255  
Insider_post 0.683 0.168 -1.550 0.122 -0.864  0.102  
Vc_back 0.925 0.108 -0.670 0.503 -0.308  0.151  
lockup 0.999 0.005 -0.110 0.909 -0.011  0.010  
Initial_return 0.975 0.092 -0.270 0.789 -0.210  0.159  
Underwriter 0.110 0.112 -2.160 0.031 -4.218  -0.205  
Auditor 0.780 0.091 -2.130 0.033 -0.476  -0.020  
Internet 1.822 0.268 4.070 0.000 0.311  0.888  
Tech 1.174 0.137 1.370 0.170 -0.069  0.389  
Hot_issue 0.962 0.386 -0.100 0.923 -0.826  0.747  
No. of obs.     614   
LR chi2(15)       165.740    
Prob > chi2   0.000    
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3.4.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
 
We conduct several sensitivity analyses to check our results’ robustness. First, we change 
the propensity score matching procedure. We match each new market IPO firm to a 
comparable official market IPO firm with a propensity score that differs by less than one-
quarter of the standard deviation of the propensity score. In our case, this comes down to 
0.084 units of propensity score instead of the more restrictive 0.01 matching criterion used 
in prior analysis. We find that changing the propensity score matching procedure does not 
impact our findings.  
Our analysis implicitly allows a new market IPO firm to be matched with an official 
market IPO firm listed in another country. However, stock markets in Europe may not be 
integrated to such an extent that IPO firms list freely across countries. To avoid this 
problem, we match new market firms only to official market firms from the same country. 
This constraint limits our sample size, but the results still show a significantly higher 
failure rate for new market IPO firms than for official market IPO firms.  
As a final sensitivity check, we vary our definition of IPO failure. We define IPO 
failure as the point when the firm’s stock price drops below either 20% or 30% of its offer 
price. Our results are robust enough to use these alternative definitions of IPO firm failure.  
 
3.5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Choosing which stock exchange to list on is an important business decision. Each 
exchange is designed for different target firms and enforces different rules of admission 
and supervision. When IPO firms qualify for listing on several stock markets, the question 
is which institutional setting, including admission criteria and supervision rules, is most 
suitable for their future development and can enhance their survival prospects. None of the 
existing studies on IPO firm failure have looked at this issue.  
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This chapter examines firms that list on Europe’s new stock markets. These new 
stock markets copied the NASDAQ model, with its low barriers to entry and tight 
disclosure rules, and had one common aim: to attract untested, early-stage, innovative, and 
high-growth ventures that, until then, had not been considered viable candidates for public 
equity financing in Europe. However, after a promising start, most of these new stock 
markets ended in failure, amidst accounting frauds and insider trading scandals that 
challenged their institutional legitimacy. We test the hypothesis that IPO firms derive their 
organizational legitimacy partly from their institutional linkage with the stock market. If 
the stock market faces a challenge to its institutional legitimacy, it is no longer viewed as a 
legitimate institution that can endorse firms’ quality. A stock market’s institutional 
legitimacy thus is expected to influence the survival prospects of all firms listed on it.  
Beginning in 1996, European firms could opt to go public on new markets or on the 
existing official stock markets. We employ propensity score matching to identify official 
market IPO firms that have similar probabilities of listing on the new markets as do the 
new market IPO firms themselves. We then compare the failure rates between these 
matched official market and new market firms. Our results show that the IPO firm failure 
rate on new stock markets is almost double that of the official market, controlling for other 
factors the prior literature has shown to impact IPO firm failure. We attribute this finding 
to the challenges to the institutional legitimacy of these new markets. 
Overall, our study contributes to the understanding of new institutional arrangements’ 
impact on survival prospects. These results suggest that managers of IPO firms should 
make careful decisions about the stock market on which they choose to list. They must 
realize that new stock markets still need to build their institutional legitimacy, and that this 
lack of establishment exposes the IPO firm to additional failure risk. New stock markets’ 
institutional legitimacy can be challenged if it fails to adequately enforce listing rules or is 
unable to remove firms that commit fraud. Our analysis shows that such a challenge to 
institutional legitimacy impacts the survivability of firms that are listed on that stock 
market (and not only those that do not comply with the rules). Our study, therefore, has 
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important policy implications for stock exchanges that plan to set up new stock market 
segments as well as for managers who must decide which stock market to go public on.  
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Chapter 4: The Mandatory IFRS Adoption in the EU 
and Analyst Forecast Properties6 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses the question of whether the adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) has increased the quality of accounting information. We 
examine this question through the impact of IFRS adoption on the quality of analyst 
forecasts. In particular, we test whether analyst forecasts become more accurate and less 
dispersed after the adoption. As our empirical context, we apply the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS for all firms listed on the exchanges of European Union (EU) countries. This uniform 
and compulsory adoption in 2005 provides a “natural experiment” through which to 
examine our research question. After controlling for company, industry, and country-level 
differences, we find that the quality of analyst forecasts to EU-listed companies increases 
after the adoption of IFRS in 2005. More specifically, the results show that analyst 
forecasts about these firms become more accurate and less dispersed after 2005. We 
interpret these results as the evidence of IFRS’s positive effects on the quality of 
accounting information.  
This study contributes to the literature on the consequences of harmonizing 
international accounting standards by investigating how IFRS adoption has impacted the 
quality of accounting information. Harmonization of accounting standards is a global trend. 
More than 100 countries around the world, including the whole EU, currently require or 
permit IFRS reporting (Ball, 2006). The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
also is considering allowing U.S. firms to prepare their financial reports in accordance with 
IFRS. During this increasing trend of IFRS adoption, researchers, investors, and standard-
setters have frequently asked questions about the quality and effects of IFRS. However, 
                                                          
6 This chapter is based on Jiao, T., Mertens, G., Roosenboom, P., 2008, “The Quality of Accounting 
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previous studies’ empirical findings have been mixed. Some studies suggest that increased 
quality of accounting information can improve the information environment of the firms 
adopting IFRS standards, which is associated with lower cost of capital (Daske et al., 
2008), increased earnings quality (Barth et al., 2007), and increased disclosure level 
(Daske and Gebhardt, 2006). Other studies, however, failed to find that IFRS had a 
positive effect on the quality of accounting information. For example, Daske (2006) fails 
to find decreased cost of capital for German firms that adopted IFRS. By examining short-
run market reactions and long-run changes in capital costs, Christensen et al. (2007) 
conclude that the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the UK does not benefit all firms. 
This chapter examines the effect of IFRS adoption on the quality of accounting 
information from the perspective of the quality of analyst forecasts. Analysts are among 
the most important and sophisticated users of financial reports. Their forecasts rely heavily 
on the accounting information provided by such reports. Hence, changes in accounting 
information can be reflected in the quality of analyst forecasts (Vergoosen, 1993; McEwen 
and Hunton, 1999; Hope, 2003). Existing literature has provided some evidence of 
accounting standards’ impacts on analyst forecasts. For example, Peek (2005) finds that 
discretionary accounting changes in the Netherlands from 1998 to 1999 have had an 
impact on the accuracy of analyst forecasts. Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) find that the 
accuracy of analyst forecasts improves after the adoption of IAS in non-U.S. firms around 
the world. Extending the work of this body of literature, we examine whether the 
conversion from local GAAPs to IFRS of EU-listed firms is reflected subsequently in 
changes in the quality of analyst forecasts. Improvements in the quality of analyst forecasts 
can be regarded as evidence of improved quality of accounting information under IFRS.  
The quality of analyst forecasts has two dimensions: accuracy and dispersion. 
Dispersion reflects differences in analysts’ understandings and expectations of firms’ 
performance. The uniform adoption of IFRS in the EU aims to increase the comparability 
                                                                                                                                                  
Information and Analyst Forecasts Properties.”  
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of financial reports of all EU-listed firms. It requires these firms to report under the same 
accounting standards and in the same formats. The IFRS thus provides equity analysts with 
a consistent guideline for understanding and comparing accounting information presented 
in accounting reports from different countries. Hence, those aspects of dispersion of 
analyst forecasts that are caused by differences in local GAAPs can be mitigated. 
Therefore, we expect the dispersion of analyst’s reports will decrease subsequently.  
Different from local GAAPs, IFRS is a set of fair value-based accounting standards 
which present the value of assets at the price at which the subject assets can be sold or 
bought as of the transaction date. In this case, accounting information prepared under IFRS 
is closer to actual economic conditions and provides a better benchmark for analysts to 
understand the economic position of the firms they follow. Hence, we expect that IFRS can 
also impact the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts.  
Our empirical setting helps to mitigate two concerns faced by prior studies. The first 
concern, which is a potential cause of prior studies’ mixed findings, is the use of samples 
composed of voluntary adopters (i.e., those who adopted IFRS before 2005). Prior studies 
(Christensen et al., 2007) have documented that IFRS’s economic consequences on 
voluntary adopters are more significant than on other firms. Voluntary adopters time their 
adoptions of IFRS to get expected gains: for example, to attract external financing 
(Ashbaugh, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005). This self-selection issue can bias either for 
or against identifying the impact of IFRS adoption on the quality of analyst forecasts. 
Second, there is a potential problem of omitted variables. In addition to changes in 
accounting standards, other factors—such as financial market development, capital, 
ownership structure, and the legal and political system—also may affect the quality of 
accounting information. For instance, using the enforcement index developed by La Porta 
et al. (1998), prior studies find that accounting quality is higher in countries with a 
common law origin and high protection of shareholder rights (Ali and Hwang, 2000; Ball 
et al. 2000; Leuz et al., 2003). These factors can be both firm-specific and country-specific, 
and can be difficult to control for. However, in the current study, EU listed firms’ 
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simultaneous adoption of IFRS at the beginning of 2005 acts as a natural experiment that 
forces all firms to follow the same set of accounting standards, IFRS, in the same way, 
regardless of differences in different countries’ institutional environments. Moreover, we 
control for the other unobservable factors by including country and industry effects in our 
analyses. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 develops the hypothesis about the 
effects of compulsory IFRS adoption on analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion. Section 
4.3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4.4 reports the results of empirical 
analysis. Section 4.5 discusses the findings and conclusions. 
 
4.2. Hypotheses 
 
4.2.1 Accuracy 
 
Our first hypothesis addresses how IFRS adoption impacts the accuracy of analyst 
forecasts. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that disclosure level can impact the accuracy of 
analyst forecasts. Among all other sources of information, financial reports are an 
important channel for communication between firms and analysts. It has been observed 
that IFRS adoption increases disclosure levels in financial reports. For example, prior 
studies (Ding et al., 2007; and Bae et al., 2007) find that firms’ financial reports prepared 
under IAS become more comprehensive than those prepared under local GAAPs. Daske 
and Gebhardt (2006) investigate whether voluntary IFRS adoption increases the disclosure 
quality of firms in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. Their study uses the available 
disclosure scores published by major business journals in these three countries and finds 
that the level of disclosure, being a metric of disclosure quality, increased significantly 
after IFRS adoption. Hence, we expect the quality of analyst forecasts to improve when 
IFRS increases firms’ disclosure levels. 
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Meanwhile, the quality of analyst forecasts relies not only on disclosure level, but 
also on disclosure quality. High-quality disclosure conveys information which is closer to 
a firm’s actual economic position. Consequently, analyst forecasts are expected to be more 
accurate if higher-quality financial information is available for analysts’ use. IFRS is a set 
of valuation-based accounting standards which requires that accounting measurements 
better reflect a firm’s economic position and performance. Some evidence already shows 
that IFRS improves the quality of accounting information, as reflected in less earnings 
management, more timely loss recognition, and more value relevance of accounting 
amounts (Barth et al, 2007). 
Besides such characteristics of IFRS, their uniform adoption across EU countries 
intends to force firms to provide higher-quality financial reports. On the one hand, the 
mandatory uniform adoption requires firms to use the same set of accounting standards, 
which limits their chances of deliberately shopping for accounting standards that are more 
beneficial to them. Also, by complying with the same accounting standards, managers 
cannot threaten to opt for auditors who give an unqualified opinion on a more favorable 
rule (Ball, 2006). On the other hand, the uniform accounting standards and reporting 
formats provide investors greater ease in comparing financial reports. By comparing 
accounting reports across peer companies, investors increase their chances of detecting 
unusual reporting behavior and hence can force management to provide higher-quality 
financial reports. Consequently, the accuracy of analyst forecasts is expected to increase. 
H 4.1: Analyst forecasts have become more accurate after the IFRS adoption in EU 
countries. 
 
4.2.2. Dispersion 
 
Financial analysts specialize in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating financial 
information (Bae et al., 2007). They use not only public information disclosed by the firm, 
but also private information which they themselves collect. Before the uniform adoption of 
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IFRS, differences in financial reports (i.e., different accounting rules and language) made 
the interpretation and understanding of financial information inconsistent. As a result, 
analysts may interpret financial reports in different ways. Differences in accounting reports 
may also cause analysts to rely less on the public information disclosed by the firm, and 
more on their own private information. Consequently, earnings forecasts for firms under 
domestic GAAP are expected to be more dispersed.  
Although the founding of the EURO zone removed differences in currencies and 
trading practices, accounting reporting standards were still diverse before the adoption of 
IFRS. Differences in accounting standards may come from differences in history, culture, 
and legal and institutional frameworks. For example, La Port et al. (1998) compares the 
quality of accounting standards for 44 countries (including major European countries) 
based on their legal origins. They find that the quality of accounting standards in countries 
from English and Scandinavian origins is significantly higher than those from French and 
German origins. These differences in accounting standards have made it more costly for 
analysts to acquire information and more complicated for them to understand and interpret 
financial reports (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001).  
With the uniform adoption of IFRS in EU countries, listed firms must prepare 
financial reports under the same set of accounting standards and in the same formats. 
Under these circumstances, financial reports from different firms and countries are 
supposed to be more comparable for financial analysis. Meanwhile, the increase in 
disclosure level and quality provides equity analysts with more public information, which 
can reduce the weight of private information in their forecasts and hence increase 
consensus among their forecasts (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). Therefore, we expect: 
H 4.2: Analyst forecasts have become less dispersed after the IFRS adoption in EU 
countries. 
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4.3. Data 
 
Our tests begin by composing a sample of public firms listed on the EU stock exchanges at 
the end of 2005. Since the beginning of 2005, the EU committee has been requiring all 
these firms to prepare their financial reports under IFRS. Although some of them had 
voluntarily adopted IFRS before 2005, we do not identify them in our sample. One reason 
is that many of them are light adopters, whose adoption of the IFRS had little economic 
consequence (Daske et al., 2008). Therefore, we expect to observe the effects of uniform 
adoption of IFRS in post-2005 period.  
Our initial sample covers the years 2004 and 2006. Out of the initial sample, we 
exclude firms listed on Alternative Investment Markets (AIM) in the UK and firms dually 
listed on exchanges outside the EU. AIM firms were allowed to delay their adoption of 
IFRS until 2007. This implies that many of them may still have followed UK GAAPs in 
2005 and 2006. Dually-listed firms (i.e., firms that also are listed in the U.S.) may have to 
prepare their financial reports under other GAAPs. Therefore, both AIM and dually-listed 
firms may not have converted to IFRS in 2005. 
We retrieve the consensus analyst forecasts of our sample firms from IBES for the 
periods of 2004 and 2006. A consensus analyst forecast is the average of available 
earnings forecasts at any time. Our study retains only the latest consensus forecast before 
the announcement of annual earnings, as it is based on all the available information in the 
market and thus is the most informative. Our sample has excluded consensus forecasts 
made during 2005, first, because the different financial year-ends caused the conversion to 
IFRS to take place during the course of 2005. Under this circumstance, it is possible that 
some analyst forecasts for firms with non-December ends to their financial years were still 
estimated under local GAAPs. Second, except for financial institutions, other firms assess 
their real economic conditions primarily through periodic impairment tests, as these firms 
must adjust their balance sheet items to reflect the items’ updated fair value. However, the 
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analyst forecasts for 2005, the first year of adoption, did not include impairment tests in 
their references.  Therefore, our sample excludes 2005. 
For the sub-sample to test analyst dispersion, we remove observations followed by 
only one analyst in order to avoid artificially lowering the dispersion of analyst forecasts. 
This is because in cases followed by only one analyst, the dispersion of analyst forecasts 
by definition is zero. However, this zero dispersion cannot be attributed to any economic 
factors that bridge differences in analyst estimates.  
We use Thomson One Banker to collect the financial information necessary for our 
analyses. To construct the volatilities of firms’ performance, we require that firms have 
five consecutive years of performance reported in Thomson One Banker. This requirement 
excludes firms with short histories from our sample. After removing all the missing 
variables, our final sample covers firms in 65 industries based on the two-digit SIC code in 
19 countries. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of observations within the sample period in 
each country. France, Germany, and the UK are the countries with the three highest 
numbers of observations. 
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Table 4.1. 
Country Distribution 
This table shows the number of observations for each country-year applied to the sample 
for regressions. 
  Accuracy Sample Dispersion Sample 
Country 2004 2006 Total 2004 2006 Total 
       
Austria 5 8 13 4 7 11 
Belgium 19 23 42 14 21 35 
Germany 65 125 190 50 93 143 
Spain 17 23 40 16 21 37 
France 61 124 185 54 104 158 
Poland 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Greece 2 14 16 1 9 10 
Italy 23 34 57 14 29 43 
Luxembourg 0 1 1    
Hungary 2 2 4 1 1 2 
Netherlands 20 37 57 18 32 50 
Portugal 3 4 7 3 4 7 
Switzerland 59 79 138 45 69 114 
United 
Kingdom 268 322 590 220 256 476 
Ireland 13 15 28 13 15 28 
Denmark 14 19 33 12 14 26 
Finland 36 59 95 31 55 86 
Norway 22 32 54 17 31 48 
Sweden 22 37 59 16 35 51 
Total 652 960 1,612 530 798 1,328 
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4.4. Methodology 
 
To test our hypotheses about whether the EU’s uniform adoption of IFRS in 2005 has 
impacted the accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts, we use univariate testing and 
multivariate regressions.  
 
4.4.1. Mean Comparison 
 
In the univariate test, we use the paired mean comparison to check whether the accuracy 
and the dispersion of analyst forecasts for the same firm have changed over the course of 
IFRS adoption. We compare the mean of accuracy and dispersion between 2004 and 2006, 
respectively. Following other studies (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001), the accuracy of analyst 
forecasts is defined as the absolute difference between consensus earnings forecast and 
actual earnings, scaled by the stock price at the end of December of one year before the 
forecasted year. The following formula describes the accuracy of analyst forecasts: 
it
itit
it P
ActualEPSorecastConsensusF
Accuracy
,1
,,
,
−
−=                                       (4.1) 
Subsequently, we identify the dispersion of analyst forecasts, which is defined as the 
absolute difference between the highest and the lowest forecast, scaled by the stock price 
at the end of December of one year before the forecasted year. The following formula 
describes the dispersion of analyst forecasts: 
it
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4.4.2 Regressions 
 
In multivariate regressions, we regress the accuracy and dispersion of analyst forecasts on 
an IFRS Dummy (IFRS) and several control variables. The IFRS dummy is a variable that 
captures the changes in financial reporting practices that were caused by the adoption of 
IFRS in 2005. We define this variable to be 1 if it is after 2005 and 0 otherwise. 
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In addition, we draw on past literature to identify a series of variables that also may 
influence analyst forecasts. By including these variables, we aim to investigate their 
incremental effects on the accuracy and dispersion of analyst forecasts. The list of control 
variables covers firm characteristics and country characteristics. 
Firm Size (LnMktCap): We use firm size to proxy for firms’ media exposure. Larger 
firms tend to have higher levels of media coverage than small firms. Hence, it is easier for 
outsiders, such as analysts, to estimate firms’ economic situations. Firm size control has 
been used by similar studies, such as that of Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001). Following these 
studies, we define firm size as the natural log of market capitalization at the calendar year 
end before the end of the financial year.  
Number of Analyst Forecasts (LnNEstimate): Analysts collect various kinds of 
information to predict firms’ performance. In addition to accounting information, other 
kinds of information also impacts the accuracy of analyst forecasts. If more analysts  are 
analyzing a firm’s performance, we assume that there is a higher possibility of including 
information other than accounting information in the forecast. Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
find that analyst forecasts have fewer errors when there are a larger number of analyst 
followings. Hence, we use the number of analyst followings to proxy for the width of non-
accounting information coverage of firms. We expect that the higher the number of analyst 
followings, the more accurate the analyst forecasts will be. However, the relation between 
the number of analyst followings and dispersion is negative, as opinions about a single 
firm can be more diverse when more analysts follow the firm. We retrieve the number of 
following analysts from the IBES dataset and take the associated logarithm. 
Performance volatility (StdROE): Performance volatilities indicate the predictability 
of a firm’s performance. More volatility implies that earnings are less predictable. 
Therefore, it is possible that the accuracy of forecasts for this type of firm is lower and the 
dispersion is higher. We calculated the standard deviation of return on earnings in the five 
years before the forecast year to proxy for firms’ performance volatility. 
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Industry, Country and Year Dummies (IndustryDummy, CountryDummy, 
YearDummy): Finally, we also include industry, country, and year dummies to control for 
the unobservable factors associated with the characteristics of industry, country, and year 
that may influence the accuracy and dispersion of analyst forecasts.   
Table 4.2 summarizes the definition of variables. Our regression model can be 
described as follows: 
it
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Table 4.2 
Variable Definitions 
This table defines the dependent and independent variables used in the analyses. 
Variable Definition 
Accuracy Accuracy is the accuracy of analysts’ consensus forecasts. It is the 
absolute difference between the consensus forecast of EPS and the 
actual EPS scaled by the stock price at the end of year t-1. 
Dispersion Dispersion is the dispersion of analysts’ consensus forecast for EPS. It 
is defined as the absolute difference between the highest estimate and 
the lowest estimate contained in consensus forecasts scaled by the 
stock price at the end of year t-1. 
IFRS IFRS is a dummy, which is equal to 1 for years before 2005 and to 0 
otherwise. 
MktCap MktCap is a firm’s market capitalization at the end of year t-1. This 
variable controls for the effects of firm size. 
NEstimate NEstimate stands for the number of estimations contained in consensus 
forecasts. 
StdROE StdROE is a variable control for the volatility of firm performance. It is 
calculated as the standard deviation of ROE based on the five years 
before year t. 
Industry 
Dummy 
This is the dummy for the industry to which a firm belongs. Industry is 
defined as the two-digit SIC code. 
Country 
Dummy 
Country Dummy is a dummy for the country where firms are 
registered. 
YearDummy This is the year dummy that controls for year effects. 
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4.5. Empirical Tests and Results 
 
4.5.1. Sample Statistics 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 4.3. On average, the accuracy 
and dispersion of earnings forecasts are about 2% of the stock prices. Analyst coverage 
ranges from 1 to 43, with a mean of 7. Our sample covers large firms with a mean firm 
size of 7.3 billion euros, which confirms that analysts tend to follow firms with longer 
histories and larger sizes. There is no significant correlation between the independent 
variables. With regard to the correlation between the dependent and independent variables, 
the accuracy and dispersion of earnings forecasts are negatively correlated with the IFRS 
dummy. In addition, both had a negative correlation with performance variance and a 
positive correlation with size variable. As for the correlation of earnings forecasts with 
analyst coverage, the accuracy of analyst forecasts has a positive correlation, and the 
dispersion with analyst forecasts has a negative correlation. This result is consistent with 
the argument that consensus analyst forecasts tend to be more accurate when more analysts 
are following a firm, but more dispersed when more analysts provide forecasts. 
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4.5.2. Empirical Results 
 
Table 4.4 presents the results of a paired mean comparison of analyst forecast accuracy 
and dispersion in 2004 and 2006. The results show that analyst forecast accuracy in 2006, 
after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, is significantly higher than analyst forecast accuracy 
in 2004, before the mandatory adoption of IFRS (p<0.01). Analyst forecast dispersion in 
2006, after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, is also significantly lower than analyst 
forecast dispersion in 2004, before the mandatory adoption of IFRS, although the 
significance is weaker (p<0.1). This suggests that on average, the accuracy of analyst 
forecasts increases about 1.8 percent of the stock price, and the dispersion of analyst 
forecasts decreases about 0.1 percent of the stock price, after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS in EU countries in 2005.  
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Table 4.4 
 Paired T-test 
These two tables show the results of the paired mean comparison between the accuracies 
of 2004 and 2006, and between the dispersions of 2004 and 2006. 
 
Results for Accuracy Sample 
Variable No. of Obs Mean Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Accuracy of 2006 558  0.0139 0.0399  0.0106  0.0172  
Accuracy of 2004 558  0.0219 0.0508  0.0176  0.0261  
Diff 558  -0.0080 0.0618  -0.0131 -0.0028  
mean(diff) = mean(Accuracy of 2006 – Accuracy of 2004)  
t =  -3.047      
p= 0.000 ***           
 
Results for Dispersion Sample 
Variable No. of Obs Mean Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Dispersion of 2006 580  0.0161 0.0234  0.0142  0.0180  
Dispersion of 2004 580  0.0177 0.0227  0.0158  0.0195  
Diff 580  -0.0016 0.0277  -0.0039  0.0006  
mean (diff) = mean(Dispersion of 2006 - Dispersion of 2004)  
t =  -1.403      
p= 0.081  *           
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Table 4.5 presents the results of a regression analysis for analyst forecast accuracy 
and dispersion in 2004 and 2006.7 Models 1 and 6 present the results of the baseline 
models. Although both firm size (MktCap) and performance volatilities (StdROE) have 
insignificant effects on both accuracy and dispersion of analyst forecasts, the number of 
estimates has a positive and significant effect on both analyst forecast accuracy (b=-0.011, 
p<0.01) and dispersion (b=0.007, p<0.01). These results show that an increase in the 
number of estimates helps to increase the accuracy of earnings forecasts; however, the 
dispersion of analyst forecasts increases when more analysts are providing forecasts.  
Models 2 and 7 present the regression results with the IFRS dummy. Model 2 shows 
that the IFRS dummy has a positive and significant effect on analyst forecast accuracy (b=-
0.007, p<0.01). This suggests that on average, analyst forecast accuracy increases by 0.6 
percent of the stock price after mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005. Model 7 shows that the 
IFRS dummy has a negative and significant effect on analyst forecast dispersion (b=-0.003, 
p<0.05). This suggests that on average, the dispersion of analyst forecasts decreases 0.3 
percent of the stock price after mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005. F-tests also show that 
the explanatory power of Models 2 and 7 improves significantly from that of Models 1 and 
6. Combined with the results of the mean comparison, the improvement in explanatory 
power is mainly the result of adding the IFRS dummy to the models.  
Models 3 and 8 present the regression results, controlling for the industry dummies. 
The results for the IFRS dummy and other control variables do not change in terms of 
magnitude or significance. Models 4 and 9 present the regression results, controlling for 
the industry and country dummies. In the accuracy regression, the results for the IFRS 
dummy do not change materially in terms of magnitude or significance either. In the 
dispersion regression, the IFRS dummy’s significance increases further compared with 
Model 8. 
                                                          
7 Observations used in paired mean comparison contain only those included in both the pre- and 
post-IFRS periods. For this reason, the total number of observations in the paired mean comparison 
is smaller than in the regression. 
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4.5.3. Robustness Check 
 
4.5.3.1. Expanding Sample Period 
 
To ensure the robustness of the results, we extend our analyses to the samples from 2003 
and 2007. Table 4.6 presents the results of regression analysis for analyst forecast accuracy 
and dispersion in 2003-2004 and 2006-2007. Models 2 and 7 present the regression results 
with the IFRS dummy. Model 2 shows that the IFRS dummy has a positive and significant 
effect on analyst forecast accuracy (b=-0.015, p<0.01). This suggests that analyst forecast 
accuracy increases on average 1.5 percent of the stock price after mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Model 7 shows that the IFRS dummy has a negative and significant effect on 
analyst forecast dispersion (b=-0.007, p<0.05). This suggests that the dispersion of analyst 
forecasts decreases on average 0.7 percent of the stock price after mandatory IFRS 
adoption. Again, F-tests show that the explanatory power of Models 2 and 7 improves 
significantly compared with that of Models 1 and 6. These outcomes are consistent with 
our hypothesis that the uniform adoption of IFRS increases the quality of analyst forecasts 
by increasing accuracy and decreasing dispersion. 
Models 3 and 8 present the regression results, controlling for Industry Dummy. 
Models 4 and 9 present the regression results, controlling for Industry Dummy and Country 
Dummy. Finally, Models 5 and 10 include Year Dummy based on Models 4 and 9. From 
Model 2 to Model 5, and from Model 7 to Model 10, the effect of the IFRS dummy is 
significantly negative, which again is consistent with our hypothesis.  
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4.5.3.2 Non-financial Firms 
 
Among all the firms, financial institutions are impacted more significantly by fair value 
accounting, as their financial assets are required to be booked as fair value. In comparison 
with financial institutions, non-financial institutions are still allowed to use historical 
values in cases where impairment tests are not relevant to them. Under this circumstance, it 
is a challenge to determine whether our findings are driven mainly by financial institutions 
and how the quality of analyst forecasts for non-financial institutions changes after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. To address these problems, we exclude financial institutions 
and redo the analyses based on equations 4.3 and 4.4. The results show that the IFRS 
dummy still consistently has a significant impact on the quality of analyst forecasts. 
Following IFRS adoption, for non-financial institutions analyst forecast accuracy increases 
and dispersion decreases.  The coefficients’ magnitudes are similar to those presented in 
Table 4.6. Table 4.7 presents the results for non-financial institutions. 
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4.5.3.3 Sample Selection Bias 
 
Our study may face a challenge in that its observation numbers are small. This problem 
stems from two sources. First, in comparison with the coverage for American firms, IBES 
has relatively smaller coverage of European firms. Second, we control for the volatility of 
firms’ performance as measured by the standard deviation of ROE, which is calculated 
based on the ROEs of the past five years. Because this calculation excludes IPO firms and 
firms with less than a five-year history, the size of the regression samples is smaller. To 
test our results in a large sample, we run our tests again without controlling for 
performance volatility, releasing the criteria so that only firms with more than a five-year 
history are included. The regression results are not materially different from our main 
results presented in previous sections. These results are still consistent with our hypothesis 
and suggest that the quality of analyst forecasts increased after the uniform IFRS adoption 
in the EU. 
 
4.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study uses the event of the EU’s compulsory adoption of IFRS to examine the impact 
of IFRS adoption on the quality of accounting information, using the quality of analyst 
forecasts as a gauge. By comparing analyst forecasts before and after the EU’s compulsory 
adoption of IFRS, we find that analyst forecasts became more accurate and less dispersed 
after IFRS adoption. These effects persist after controlling for factors such as firm size; 
number of analysts following performance volatility; and country, industry, and year 
dummies. 
Empirically, we interpret these results as evidence that accounting reporting quality 
improved with compulsory IFRS adoption in EU countries. Although this study tests the 
effects of IFRS adoption indirectly, we claim that it is reasonable to attribute the 
improvement of analyst forecast quality to improvements in the quality of accounting 
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information following compulsory IFRS adoption, since IFRS adoption is the only 
systematic difference between the two samples in our study. The empirical design also 
allows us to limit concerns about methodological problems prevalent in prior studies: 
namely, the problems of selection bias and omitted variables. As a result, we believe this 
study provides more robust and convincing evidence compared with that in prior studies. 
Theoretically, our study also contributes to the literature on accounting standards’ 
effects on the quality of accounting information. The results show that more homogenous, 
value-relevant accounting standards such as IFRS can actually help improve the quality of 
accounting information and reduce information asymmetries among managers, analysts, 
and investors. Therefore, it is possible for policy makers to improve the information 
disclosure environment by improving accounting standards.  
In practical terms, our study’s findings also help to address concerns about the quality 
and effects of IFRS. Using a more recent sample and a cleaner, more powerful study 
design, we find strong and significant improvements in the quality of analyst earnings 
forecasts after EU countries’ compulsory adoption of IFRS in 2005. This demonstrates the 
value of more universal, value-relevant international accounting for financial analysts and 
investors.  
Although our study is one of the first to examine the effects of accounting standards 
on the quality of accounting information using the EU countries’ compulsory adoption of 
IFRS in 2005 as the empirical context, we expect and hope that this event will attract more 
research interest in relation to other dimensions of the quality of accounting information. 
We believe that further examination of these dimensions will lead to more fruitful findings 
about the effects of accounting standards on the quality of accounting information and 
contribute more generally to our knowledge about the effects of accounting standards on 
the quality of accounting information.  
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Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions 
 
This dissertation has examined different topics related to accounting quality, including 
incentives for earnings management, consequences of accounting frauds in newly-
established stock exchanges, and the effectiveness of changes in accounting standards. 
This chapter summarizes the findings and conclusions of the preceding chapters, and 
suggests topics for further research. 
Chapter 2 investigates the association between earnings management and firms’ 
external environments, namely the level of industry valuation. The existing literature 
analyzes incentives for earnings management mainly from a firm-specific point of view or 
a transaction-specific point of view while ignoring that as part of its industry environment, 
the benefits and costs of earnings management for a firm can be interchanged with its 
industry valuation. Therefore, we argue that the net benefits of managing earnings increase 
with the level of industry valuation, leading to increases in the level of earnings 
management as well. We use a sample of U.S. publicly-traded firms from 1985 to 2005, 
and find a positive relationship between lagged industry valuation and the proxies of 
earnings management. Empirical results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in 
the aggregate stock market valuation is associated with a significant increase of 2.4 cents 
in quarterly earnings per share. This study’s findings suggest that higher industry valuation 
is an additional incentive for earnings management of all firms in that industry, so that 
market regulators may need to be more cautious about earnings management behavior in a 
boom market. 
Chapter 3 is formed against the background of the failure, in the early 2000s, of the 
European new markets, including the German Neuer Markt, the French Nouveau Marché, 
the Dutch NMAX, EuroNM Belgium, and the Italian Nuovo Mercato. After this market’s 
short period of success, its legitimacy was challenged by scandals involving insider trading 
and accounting frauds. As a new market, the European New Market failed to solve the 
crisis and was forced to close. This chapter investigates whether the weak legitimacy of 
102
Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusion 
94 
EU new markets is one of the factors leading to IPO failure, as it is challenging for the 
legitimacy of a newly-established market to survive the impact of major accounting 
scandals and insider trading. This study is the first in IPO failure literature to investigate 
the effects of the legitimacy of stock exchanges on IPO failure rate. After controlling for 
the effects of some firm characteristics and accounting characteristics, such as leverage, 
profitability, and auditors’ reputations, we find that listing on a new stock market nearly 
doubled the IPO firms’ failure risk compared with listing on long-established stock 
markets. In addition, our results show that firms with high profitability and Big-5 auditors 
have a lower risk of IPO failure. These results suggest that managers of IPO firms must 
make careful decisions about the stock market on which they will list. They should realize 
that the institutional legitimacy of newly-established stock markets is still vulnerable and 
that this exposes the IPO firm to additional risk of failure. 
In Chapter 4, we turn our focus to the effects of the EU countries’ compulsory 
adoption of IFRS in 2005, and test whether this adoption increases the quality of 
accounting information. We examine the changes in the quality of accounting information 
through the effects of IFRS adoption on the quality of analyst forecasts. After controlling 
for a series of company, industry, and country-level differences, we find that the quality of 
analyst forecasts of EU listed firms increases after IFRS adoption in 2005. More 
specifically, the results show that analyst forecasts for these firms become more accurate 
and less dispersed after 2005. We interpret these results as evidence of IFRS’s positive 
effects on the quality of accounting reports. 
Chapter 4 provides additional evidence in relation to the existing literature’s mixed 
findings about the consequences of adopting IFRS. The EU countries’ adoption of IFRS 
forced firms to switch to IFRS regardless of their incentives to adopt IFRS or the 
characteristics of their institutional environment. Therefore, this compulsory adoption 
mitigates the empirical problems faced by prior studies (i.e., self-selection bias and omitted 
variables).  
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This dissertation attempts to contribute to several streams of literature, including 
earnings management, accounting regulation, and institutional theory. The evidence 
presented in these essays highlights the important role of firms’ external environments on 
their earnings management behavior, as well as the consequences of the firms’ accounting 
frauds and insider trading behavior on the failure rate of IPO firms. We also show that 
improving the effectiveness of accounting rules, such as the implementation of IRFS, may 
help improve the quality of accounting information. 
Obviously, this dissertation opens several new directions for further investigation. 
Chapter 2 has shown that industry valuation influences firms’ earnings management 
decisions. However, there is no direct evidence showing how the behavior of other parties, 
such as analysts, auditors and market regulators, might respond to changes in industry 
valuation.  
Chapter 3 shows that in general, the IPO failure rate in EU new markets is lower than 
that in established ones. But because of the established markets’ high admission thresholds, 
young firms still have to resort to new markets to get external financing. This raises 
questions as to what types of firms are more sustainable in new markets and how the 
institutional design of entrepreneurial firms’ markets could be adjusted in order to improve 
their ability to react to challenges. 
Chapter 4 tests the effects of the introduction of IFRS on the quality of accounting 
information. Future research could investigate whether and how the detailed differences 
between IFRS and (previously existing) local GAAPs improve the quality of accounting 
information. 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
De hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift behandelen winststuring (hoofdstuk 2), het gevolg 
van boekhoudschandalen op de overlevingskansen van beursgangers (hoofdstuk 3) en de 
doeltreffendheid van maatregelen die door regelgevers op het terrein van externe 
verslaggeving worden genomen om de kwaliteit van externe verslaggeving te verbeteren 
(Hoofdstuk 4). 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 concentreert zich op de vraag of winststuring samenhangt met 
omgevingsfactoren. De hoofdhypothese luidt dat winststuring positief samenhangt met de 
marktwaarde van de gehele bedrijfstak. Meer in het bijzonder, winststuring door middel 
van accruals zal frequenter plaatsvinden bij een hogere marktwaardering omdat het voor 
een individuele onderneming meer voordelen oplevert bij een hogere marktwaardering van 
de gehele bedrijfstak, omdat de negatieve effecten verbonden aan de omkering van 
accruals en de waarschijnlijkheid van het kunnen detecteren van winststuring lager worden 
verondersteld in een dergelijke periode. Aldus zal de verhoging van het netto voordeel 
leiden tot een winststuring op grotere schaal. Wij onderzoeken een steekproef van 
Amerikaanse ondernemingen op basis van kwartaal data over een periode van 20 jaar; 
vanaf 1985 tot 2005. Wij vinden wij een positief verband tussen de waarding van de gehele 
bedrijfstak en winststuring, gemeten aan de hand van de totale gezamenlijke (huidige) 
hoeveelheid accruals. De empirische resultaten tonen aan dat één standaard deviatie 
verhoging van de waardering van de gehele bedrijfstak gepaard gaat met een significante 
verhoging van 2.4 cent van het kwartaal winst per aandeel van een gemiddelde 
onderneming. Onze studie toont aan dat niet alleen bedrijfsspecifieke omstandigheden 
aanleiding kunnen zijn voor winststuring, maar dat ook macro economische en 
marktomstandigheden hierop van invloed zijn. Tot op heden is hieraan weinig aandacht 
besteed in de literatuur. De resultaten zouden ook aanleiding moeten zijn voor regelgevers 
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en gebruikers van financiële informatie extra kritisch te zijn op signalen die mogelijk 
duiden op winststuring in een periode waarin effectenbeurzen sterk opleven. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 is gewijd aan het in kaart brengen van de gevolgen van boekhoudschandalen 
op de overlevingskansen van beursgangers. In dit hoofdstuk kijken we naar nieuwe 
Europese markten, dat wil zeggen, de Duitse Neuer Markt, de Franse Nouveau Marché, de 
Nederlandse NMAX, de EuroNM België en de Italiaanse Nuovo Mercato,. Elk van deze 
vijf markten faalden na de ontdekking van handel met voorkennis en boekhoudschandalen. 
 
Wij zijn in het bijzonder geïnteresseerd of het falen van deze nieuwe effectenbeurzen deels 
kan worden toegeschreven aan institutionele gebreken en onderzoeken of het 
falingspercentage van beursgangen hoger is voor deze nieuwe effectenbeurzen in 
vergelijking met de officiële markten. Op basis van een vergelijkbare steekproef van 
officiële markten berekenen wij de kans op overleving zowel op de nieuwe als op de 
officiële effecten beurzen. Hierbij controleren wij tevens voor verscheidene 
karakteristieken, zoals de hoeveelheid vreemd vermogen, de reputatie van de controlerend 
accountant en de rentabiliteit van de onderneming. Onze resultaten tonen aan dat het 
falingspercentage van beursgangen dubbel zo groot is op nieuwe effectenbeurzen dan op 
de reeds lang gevestigde officiële effectenbeurzen. Wij stellen dat de institutionele context 
en legitimiteit van de onlangs tot stand gebrachte nieuwe effectenbeurzen gebrekkig en 
kwetsbaar is en dat dit nieuwe beursgaande ondernemingen aan extra risico’s en 
dientengevolge mislukking kan blootstellen. Een andere bevinding van dit hoofdstuk is dat 
ex-ante boekhoudkundige informatie invloed heeft op de slagingspercentage van 
beursgangen. Tevens vinden wij dat ondernemingen met een controlerend accountant van 
een de  vier grote kantoren (big four) en de hogere winstgevendheid lagere kans hebben 
om te falen. Deze bevindingen zijn in overeenstemming met Demers en Joos (2007), die 
beargumenteren dat boekhoudkundige informatie een belangrijke rol speelt bij het 
verklaren van de overlevingskansen van beursgangers. 
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In hoofdstuk 4 doen wij onderzoek naar de gevolgen van de maatregelen van regelgevers 
om de kwaliteit van externe verslaggeving te verbeteren. De verplichte goedkeuring van de 
International Financial Reporting Standard (“IFRS”) in de landen van de EU in 2005 is 
één van de belangrijkste maatregelen die door regelgevers is opgelegd. Het belangrijkste 
doel hiervan is om de vergelijkbaarheid en de kwaliteit van boekhoudkundige informatie te 
verbeteren. Recent hebben diverse onderzoekers gepoogd de gevolgen van de 
implementatie IFRS vanuit verscheidene perspectieven te onderzoeken. De voorlopige 
conclusie is dat de empirische bevindingen niet eenduidig zijn. Ter illustratie, een aantal 
studies levert bewijs dat de invoering van IFRS positieve gevolgen heeft, zoals 
bijvoorbeeld een lagere kostenvoet (Daske et al, 2008), hogere winstkwaliteit (Barth et al. 
2007) en toegenomen transparantie (Daske en Gebhardt, 2006). Echter, andere auteurs 
bestrijden deze positieve gevolgen en komen onder meer tot de conclusie dat 
implementatie van IFRS geen significante invloed heeft op de kostenvoet van 
ondernemingen (Daske, 2006; Christensen et al., 2007). In dit hoofdstuk, onderzoeken wij 
of de verplichte goedkeuring van IFRS in de Europese Unie invloed heeft op de kwaliteit 
van boekhoudkundige informatie, gemeten aan de hand van de kwaliteit van 
analistenvoorspellingen. Analisten zijn belangrijke en professionele gebruikers van 
financiële verslaggeving door ondernemingen en hun voorspellingen hangen grotendeels af 
van de kwaliteit en transparantie van deze verslagen. Op basis hiervan beargumenteren wij 
dat veranderingen in boekhoudregels de kwaliteit van verslaggeving hebben beïnvloedt, 
welke weerspiegeld worden in de kwaliteit van analistenvoorspellingen. Daarom testen wij 
of de verplichte goedkeuring van IFRS de nauwkeurigheid van analistvoorspellingen heeft 
verbeterd en tevens heeft geleid tot een lagere spreiding van deze voorspellingen. Ons 
empirisch onderzoek toont aan dat de analistenvoorspellingen nauwkeuriger zijn en een 
lagere standaard deviatie hebben na 2005, het jaar van de invoering van IFRS. Deze 
resultaten rechtvaardigen de conclusie dat de verplichte invoering van IFRS de kwaliteit 
van financiële verslaggeving en daarvan afgeleid informatie heeft verbeterd. 
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中文摘要 (Summary in Chinese) 
 
资本市场是现代经济不可或缺的一部分。投资机会和融资需求在这里完成了互
相匹配的过程。在这个过程中，会计信息是投资者做出投资决策的重要依据。然
而，相对于融资者，投资者在对信息的取得和认知方面处于劣势。首先为了吸引投
资，融资者可以有选择地披露有利于自身的信息；其次融资者可以通过利润管理甚
至操纵造假来提升自身的价值。然而即使融资者采用这两种手段，即选择性披露和
会计操纵，由为缺乏更有效的信息渠道，投资者也很难发现。因此，为了保护投资
者的利益和维持资本市场的秩序，会计信息的质量至关重要。 
会计信息的质量通常通过多个方面进行评价，例如信息披露是否完整，利润管
理是否过度，损失确认是否及时。通常高质量的会计准则能够提供高度，完整的信
息披露，限制利润管理的空间，并且要求及时的损失确认。同时，除了高质量的财
务会计准则之外，对财务会计准则的执行力度也是保证高质量财务信息的关键。研
究（Ball 等，2003; Holthausen, 2003）发现公司及审计的动机，法律和政治体系，所
有者结构，金融市场的发达程度等都会影响会计信息的质量。例如 Burgsthaler 等
(2007)发现在发达金融市场，上市公司的利润操纵的程度比较低。Francis 和 Wang 
(2008) 发现聘请四大会计师事务所的公司能够提供较高质量的会计信息。Francis 等 
(2005)发现当公司需要外部融资的时候，他们总是提供多于最低会计规则要求的信
息。 
这篇论文旨在为会计信息质量文献提供更多的发现。论文第二章研究行业估值
与利润操纵动机的关系，第三章探讨了新兴市场（new markets）在内幕交易和会计
造假影响下失败的原因，第四章分析国际会计准则（IFRS）的采用是否能够提高分
析师业绩预测能力。 
论文第二章提出行业估值是利润管理的另一动机。在行业估值高涨时，利润管
理的成本下降，收益升高，因此净收益也随之升高。相反，行业估值低迷时，利润
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管理的净收益下降。由此推断公司有更大的动机在行业估值高涨时，进行更多的利
润管理。文章分析了美国市场 1985 年至 2005 年所有上市公司的数据，发现行业中
公司的平均利润操纵程度与行业估值成正比。这一发现与行业估值和利润管理的程
度成正比的假说一致。 
第二章探讨了上市公司外部环境对上市公司利润管理动机的影响，第三章进一
步研究公司的内幕交易，利润操纵是否会影响公司的外部环境，即资本市场。这一
章借助欧洲新兴市场（European new markets）为实证背景。欧洲新兴市场成立于
2000 年前后，包括西欧五个国家（荷兰，比利时，法国，德国，意大利）的新兴市
场。这些市场最初完全采用了纳斯达克交易所的模式，即较低的上市要求和严格的
信息披露制度。但随着一系列内幕交易，会计丑闻的揭发，投资者对新兴市场信心
剧减，新兴市场交易量下降，股价暴跌，最终导致五大欧洲新兴市场的关闭。这一
章认为选择在新兴市场上市是导致很多的上市公司失败的一大原因。在这一章中，
我们根据上市公司上市之前的特征，挑选出一批符合主板上市要求的新兴市场上市
公司并对这些公司上市新兴市场倾向打分。同时我们用同样的标准和方法对同时期
在主板上市的公司进行打分。通过将新兴市场公司的分数与同时期主板上市公司的
分数比较，我们从两个市场挑选出分数最接近的样本公司进行匹配（Propensity 
Score Matching）并得到了最终的研究样本。在对样本中来自不同市场的公司的生存
能力进行分析之后（Cox Proportional Hazard Regression），我们发现新兴市场公司
的上市失败风险 (IPO Failure Rate)是主板上市的两倍。但是同时我们发现，聘用高
知名度的审计，例如五大会计师事务所，能够将此失败风险降低 22%。 
论文第四章以 2005 年欧盟国家执行国际会计准则为背景，分析国际会计准则的
采用是否提高分析师的预测能力。会计信息是证券分析师的重要分析依据。会计信
息的质量影响着最终预测的质量。尽管国际会计准则被认为是一套高质量的会计准
则，但是一直以来学术界并不能就是否国际会计准则提高了会计信息的质量给出一
致的答案。学术界认为不能得出一致答案的主要原因是早期的研究样本多是由自愿
121
 
      113 
采用国际会计准则的公司构成。这些公司选择国际会计准则多是出于对自身利益的
考虑，并且在执行力度上存在差异。然而欧盟国际会计准则的强制执行去除了因为
一系列其他动机而转换会计准则的可能，为我们提供一个天然的实验机会。在这一
章，我们通过对国际会计准则采用前后证券分析师利润预测质量的分析比较，从侧
面判断是否会计信息的质量得到了提高。我们的实证研究包括了所有欧盟国家上市
公司 2003-2004 及 2006-2007 的数据。通过均值比较和回归分析，结果显示，采用国
际会计准则之后证券分析师利润预测的准确度提高，分散度降低。这表明国际会计
准则的采用提高了证券分析师的预测表现。 
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This dissertation investigates the interaction between the quality of accounting infor -
ma tion and firms’ external environment – the institutions under which they operate, such
as industry and stock exchange. The research in this dissertation deals with the motivation
for earnings management (chapter 2), the consequence of accounting frauds on the failure
rate of IPO firms (chapter 3), and the effectiveness of actions taken by standard-setters to
improve the quality of accounting information (Chapter 4).
Chapter 2 focuses on firms’ industry environment and investigates whether industry
valuation has an impact on managers’ decisions to manage earnings. Based on U.S. market
data between 1985 and 2005, we find that industry valuation is positively correlated with
the magnitude of earnings management in that industry. Chapter 3 examines the conse -
quences of insider trading and accounting scandals on firms’ external environment and
uses the failure of European new markets as the empirical background. Using propensity
score matching and Cox proportional hazard regression, we find that listing on a European
new market doubles an IPO firm’s failure rate as compared with listing on an official
market. Finally, Chapter 4 examines whether the uniform adoption of IFRS by EU countries
in 2005 improved the quality of accounting information through the investigation of
changes in the quality of analyst forecasts. The empirical results show that the accuracy of
analyst forecasts increased, and the dispersion decreased, after the adoption of IFRS. 
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